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41. Introduction
On 5 October 2015, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released its
final report on improving the effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms (Action 14) as part of the
package that included final reports on all 15 BEPS actions.
The Action 14 report, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective (the report on Action 14)
presents a commitment by countries to implement certain “minimum standards” on dispute resolution,
according to the OECD. In many ways, Action 14 is the linchpin to the success of the entire BEPS project.
To implement the significant changes developed under the BEPS and make certain that there is neither
unintended double taxation nor double non-taxation, there must be strong and effective mechanism in
place when disputes do (inevitably) arise. While the goal of the BEPS project is to create a more cohesive
international tax framework, it would be naïve to assume that governments will suddenly stop having
disagreements over how a particular transaction should be taxed or how a treaty provision should be
applied. Indeed, we could see more disputes if countries do not implement the BEPS recommendations in
their domestic law in a broadly consistent manner. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the
implementation of the suggested BEPS proposals is complemented by stronger and more efficient
dispute resolution mechanism to ensure certainty for businesses.
In the first part of our research, we have provided an overview of the existing MAP process in Singapore
and the experiences around it. We have further provided an overview of the MAP process in selected
Asian countries (Japan, China, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia), as well as the US and European
countries as a whole. In the following, we have provided an overview of the minimum standards according
to Action 14, which should be implemented by all the countries that are signatories to the BEPS. This is
followed by a gap analysis vis-à-vis the existing MAP process in Singapore and the selected Asian
countries. We then describe the best practices, which are not mandatory but would be recommended
according to the report on Action 14, followed by a further gap analysis vis-à-vis the existing MAP process
in Singapore and the selected Asian countries.
We have also discussed arbitration as recommended under Action 14 including an overview of the
already existing arbitration systems. This section also seeks to analyse the practical experience of
arbitration in other countries and evaluates arbitration as an additional dispute resolution mechanism for
Singapore.
Finally, we analyse implications of the multilateral instrument developed as part of Action 15 and the joint
audit as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
52. MAP process in selected countries
In this section, we have provided an overview of the existing MAP process in Singapore, selected Asian
countries as well as Europe (in general) and the US. With regards to the existing treaty network of these
countries, we have provided comments on whether these countries have implemented articles
corresponding to Article 9 and 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (MTC) in their tax treaties. We also
referred to the MAP process implemented in the domestic tax law and analysed whether these countries
have already established arbitration as an additional way of resolving disputes where MAP does not
result in resolution.
2.1 Singapore and selected Asian countries
i. Singapore
Singapore is not an OECD member but is a member of the Forum on Tax Administration for Mutual
Agreement Procedures (FTA MAP Forum) and insofar fully participates in its work. On 16 June 2016,
Singapore announced that it would join the inclusive framework1 for the global implementation of the
OECD BEPS project as a BEPS Associate.2 As a BEPS Associate, Singapore works with other
jurisdictions to help develop the implementation and monitoring phase of the BEPS project. As a
participant at the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs since 2013, Singapore has been active in providing
input to the design of the BEPS project. Singapore has also worked with the OECD and G20 to ensure
that the new framework for implementing the BEPS project is inclusive. Singapore has also played a key
role as part of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information. Mrs. Chia-Tern Huey
Min3 is the Singapore’s representative to OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA). In June 2016, she
assumed the role of Chair of the Peer Review Group of the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for tax purposes.
Singapore has expressed its commitment to implementing the four minimum standards under the BEPS
project, namely, the standards on countering harmful tax practices, preventing treaty abuse, transfer
pricing documentation, and enhancing dispute resolution4.
Tax treaties
Singapore has agreed on MAP in all of its tax treaties and has generally implemented regulations
according to Article 25 paragraphs 1 to 3 of the OECD MTC in its tax treaties. However, arbitration
(regulation corresponding to Article 25 paragraph 5 of the OECD MTC) is only agreed upon in the tax
treaty with Mexico5. Nevertheless, there is no established arbitration practice in place and until now
Singapore has not had any case of arbitration.
1 Under this framework, all state- and non-state jurisdictions that commit to the BEPS project participate as BEPS
Associates of the OECD’s CFA. BEPS associates have the same rights and obligations as OECD and G20 countries
involved in BEPS work. Every jurisdiction that participates in the framework as a BEPS Associate will have an equal
voice in reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the BEPS measures.
2 Press release from Ministry of Finance dated 16 June 2016
3 Deputy Commissioner (International, Investigation & Indirect Taxes Group)
4 Press release from Ministry of Finance dated 16 June 2016
5 Article 25 paragraph 5 of the tax treaty between Singapore and Mexico
6The timeline for presenting a MAP case varies in Singapore’s tax treaties between two (e.g., tax treaties
with Canada, Oman, Philippines and four and a half years (tax treaty with Mexico) whereby the majority of
Singapore’s tax treaties provide for a timeline of three years and some do not provide for a special
timeline at all (e.g., tax treaties with Australia, Korea and France).
All of the Singapore tax treaties provide for a regulation similar to Article 9 paragraph 1 of the OECD MTC
and a majority of those treaties also provide for a regulation similar to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD
MTC. MAP access is also granted although the underlying tax treaty does not provide for a regulation in
accordance with Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC.
The tax treaty signed between Singapore and India originally did not have a provision corresponding to
Article 9(2) of the OECD MTC which restricted the taxpayers’ access to the MAP in transfer pricing cases
and bilateral APAs. This was in view of the position adopted by India that MAP or bilateral APA cannot be
proceeded with a treaty partner in the absence of a provision corresponding to Article 9(2) of the OECD
MTC. However, recently on 30 December 2016, a protocol has been signed between the two countries
which seeks to amend inter alia Article 9 of the treaty to add a provision similar to paragraph 2 of Article 9
of OECD MTC opening up the route of MAP and bilateral APAs for taxpayers. The Protocol shall come
into effect on the later of date on which India and Singapore notify the same, failing which it shall come
into effect from 1 April 2017.
Further, it is likely that Singapore will provide MAP access in case of a disagreement between the
taxpayer and the competent authority as to whether the conditions for the application of a treaty or
domestic anti-abuse rule have been met.
Domestic tax law
From a national tax law perspective, there is guidance on the MAP process available in Singapore, which
is outlined in the transfer pricing guidelines of the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS)6.
Further, it is also possible to resolve the double taxation through a domestic appeal parallel to the MAP.
The guidelines outline the MAP process (dispute resolution for past years) and APA (dispute resolution
for future years) in the same sections. A roll-back of bilateral and multilateral APA to prior years is in
principle possible but generally limited to a period of two fiscal years7. Roll-back is not allowed in case of
unilateral APAs.
Main characteristics of MAP in Singapore are as follows:
· Types: bilateral agreement between IRAS and a foreign competent authority, multilateral
agreement between IRAS and two or more foreign competent authorities
· Objective: Eliminate double taxation, provide tax certainty
· Legal basis: Singapore tax treaties
· Availability: Singapore tax resident taxpayers
· Financial Years: Past fiscal years
· Filing fee: Free of charge8
6 IRAS e-Tax Guide, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Third edition), published on 4 January 2016, first edition on 23
  February 2006
7 IRAS e-Tax Guide, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Third edition), published on 4 January 2016, point 8.17 and 8.18
8 IRAS e-Tax Guide, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Third edition), published on 4 January 2016, point 8
7The guidelines divide the MAP process into 5 steps9:
Step 1: Notification of intent: The taxpayer has to inform the IRAS of its intent within the time limit
specified in the MAP Article of the tax treaty. The notification to the IRAS should be in writing and include
a brief description of the cause and circumstances for double taxation.
Step 2: First pre-filing meeting: IRAS meets taxpayer within one month upon receiving the notification
of intent. During the pre-filing meeting, the taxpayer further outlines the circumstances and reasons for
the MAP whereas the IRAS evaluates whether the MAP request is justifiable and indicates whether they
will accept the MAP request. One of the conditions for the acceptance of the MAP is that adequate
transfer pricing documentation is available and can be provided to the IRAS.
Step 3: Submission of MAP application: The taxpayer submits the application upon IRAS indicating
that application can be submitted. The IRAS issues the acceptance letter within one month from receipt of
application.
Step 4: Review & negotiation: IRAS informs the taxpayer of the MAP outcome within one month from
reaching the agreement by the competent authorities.
Step 5 Implementation: Taxpayer and IRAS implement the MAP outcome.
The guidelines describe the process in detail and even provide for templates / formats in the appendix for
the letter of authorisation10, minimum information required for pre-filing meeting11 etc.
There is no specific timeline mentioned in the guidelines for reaching an agreement. From our practical
experience, MAP cases are generally resolved within an average period of 24 months, however this is
largely dependent on the complexity of the case.
The guidelines clarify that the MAP and APAs do not deprive taxpayers of other remedies available under
the domestic tax law and in case of adjudication through any legal and judicial proceedings while the
MAP/APA process is still on-going, the competent authorities will discuss and decide if the MAP/APA
process should cease or be suspended. The IRAS can also reject a MAP application or can discontinue
with a MAP process if the taxpayer is not cooperative (e.g., the tax payer does not provide necessary
information). In case of a rejection of MAP by the IRAS, there is no obligation to inform the other country
to comment on the case.
The guidelines do not contain specific regulation regarding the consideration of interest and penalties and
the suspension of collection procedures during a pending MAP case.
Further aspects
Singapore has just started to publish statistics on its MAP and APA cases. There are no administrative
processes in place to publish agreements reached as kind of a best practice.
The official in charge of MAP in Singapore has the authority to resolve MAP cases and is principally not
dependent on the approval of the direction of the tax administration personnel who made the
adjustments.
9 IRAS e-Tax Guide, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Third edition), published on 4 January 2016, point 9.2
10 IRAS e-Tax Guide, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Third edition), published on 4 January 2016, Annex B1
11 IRAS e-Tax Guide, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Third edition), published on 4 January 2016, Annex B2
8While the Key Performance Indicators (KPI) of the functioning of MAP officials are not publicly available,
these are expected to be based on number of cases solved rather than on the amount of revenue.
ii. China
China is not an OECD member. However, China is a member of the G20 and FTA MAP Forum and
regularly participating in its work.
Tax treaties
In principle, the Chinese tax treaties follow the OECD MTC paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 25 in relation to
MAP. Chinese tax treaties generally do not include any provisions for arbitration.
China generally provides for MAP access in transfer pricing cases (including cases where the tax treaty
does not have a regulation in accordance with Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC). It further
provides for MAP access in case of a disagreement between the taxpayer and the competent authority as
to whether the conditions for the application of a treaty or domestic anti-abuse rule have been met.
Since 2005, China has gradually developed MAP relationship with Japan, the US, Korea, Denmark and
several other countries. China conducts regular MAP meetings with Japan, three to five times a year on
nearly 10 cases.
Domestic tax law
According to the report “Mutual Agreement Procedure and Advanced Pricing Agreements: China’s
Implementation and Application12”, the legal basis and relevant laws, regulations and implementation
rules governing MAP and APA primarily include the following:
a)  Treaty or arrangement for the avoidance of double taxation
b) The Corporate Income Tax Law
c) The implementation regulations of the Corporate Income Tax Law
d) The implementation regulations of tax collection and administration law
e) The implementation measures of special tax adjustments
China provides for and publishes rules, guidelines and procedures, which are publicly available.
There is no specific timeline mentioned in the tax law for reaching an agreement. From our practical
experience, MAP cases are generally resolved within an average period of two years or longer. Further,
there are no specific regulations addressing the relationship between MAP and other domestic judicial
procedures.
China provides for bilateral APAs and taxpayers can choose to apply a roll-back of an APA to previous
years (maximum up to 10 years).
12 report.nat.gov.tw/ReportFront/report_download.jspx?sysId, 2.3 Existing legal basis
9There are no specific regulations available regarding the suspension of collection procedures during a
pending MAP case. Further, China does not provide for specific regulations regarding the consideration of
interest and penalties. However, in practice the Chinese tax authorities refer to the interest provisions for
transfer pricing audits.
Further aspects
China issues annual reports for APA statistics. For MAP, the State Administration of Taxation, China
(SAT) internally issues the statistics regarding the number of MAP cases handled and concluded each
year (information is not publicly available). China’s MAP cases were included in the MAP Statistics of the
OECD for 201313 for the first time. Further, there are no administrative processes in place to publish
agreements reached as kind of a best practice.
There is a shortage of resources at the SAT level14. The SAT has been training up the technical skills of
provincial level tax officers. For several provinces / cities with more transfer pricing audit experience, the
SAT would rely on the provincial / municipal tax authorities to handle controversy cases.
The officials in charge of MAP in China do not have the authority to resolve MAP cases on their own.
There is an approval process in place from the provincial level to the SAT level and also within the SAT.
There is no public information available in China about the performance indicators used. The number of
cases handled and the amount of tax revenue collected seem to be important considerations.
iii. Japan
Japan is an OECD member as well as a member of the G20 and FTA MAP Forum and insofar fully
participating in its work.
Tax treaties
The Japanese tax treaties generally follow the OECD MTC and Japan has generally implemented
regulations according to Article 25 paragraphs 1 to 3 of the OECD MTC in its tax treaties. Japan has
already introduced MAP arbitration in several tax treaties and has also introduced it into its national law15.
On 22 January 2016, representatives of Japan and Chile signed an income tax treaty and protocol. The
treaty reflects the provisions in the OECD MTC as well as recommendations in the OECD final reports on
BEPS including inter alia the provisions of mandatory arbitration under Article 25. Japan also signed a
revised income-tax treaty with Germany in December 2015, which includes certain recommendations of
the BEPS including inter alia the provisions of mandatory binding arbitration.
The majority of Japan’s treaties contain time limits for the presentation of a MAP case. These time limits
are also binding from a national tax law perspective16.
Japan’s DTAs generally provide for a regulation in accordance with Article 9 paragraph 1 and 2 of the
OECD MTC in its tax treaties. MAP access is provided even in case a tax treaty does not explicitly refer to
a provision corresponding to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC.
13 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2013.htm
14 report.nat.gov.tw/ReportFront/report_download.jspx?sysId, 4. Capacity Building Program
15 Chapter 5 of the Commissioner’s Directive on the Mutual Agreement Procedure
16 Chapter 2, point 4 of the Commissioner’s Directive on the Mutual Agreement Procedure
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Domestic tax law
From a domestic tax law perspective, the MAP process is regulated in the Commissioner’s Directive on
the MAP (Administrative Guidelines). This directive clarifies the procedures with regard to the MAP
provided for in tax treaties17. The MAP process is described clearly in detail and the underlying rules and
guidelines are published and publicly available. Inter alia, it defines examples of cases in which a request
for MAP can be made18, the pre-filing consultation, including a consultation on an anonymous basis19 and
procedures for requesting for MAP20.
Japan may limit the access to MAP based on the argument that the taxpayer fails to cooperate faithfully
with the request for submission of documents. Further, Japan has a consultation process in place, in
which Japan will inform the other country for its comments in case of a rejection of the MAP application.
There is no specific timeline mentioned in the tax law for reaching an agreement. However, on an
average, MAP cases are generally resolved within an average period of 22.4 months21.
Japan provides for bilateral APAs as well as a roll-back of such APA up to six previous years.
There is guidance available in Japan on the relationship between the MAP and domestic law
administrative and judicial remedies and the taxpayers can request suspension of the MAP proceedings
for the reasons such as the applicant giving priority to the administrative appeal / litigation. The guidance
also states that the arbitration proceedings can be terminated where a decision on the unresolved issues
submitted to arbitration has been rendered by a court or administrative tribunal in Japan or its equivalent
in the treaty partner country.
Further, there are specific regulations available regarding the suspension of collection procedures during
a pending MAP case but there are no specific regulations available for the treatment of interest and
penalties.
An important feature of the Japanese domestic law is the “donation rules22”, which allows powers to the
tax authorities to re-characterise any payments made by a corporation that is a “gift” or gratuitous
furnishing” as a donation, which are non-deductible when paid to a non-resident related party and are
taxable in the hands of the recipient. It is noteworthy that the Japanese transfer pricing regulations clarify
that the transactions falling under transfer pricing rules are also subject to donation rules. This could lead
to potential issues even in cases where the Japanese taxpayer earns higher than the arm’s length price /
margin or earns a price / margin which is different from the contractual price / margin. Further, the
donation assessments are not eligible for MAP process under the tax treaty which augments the chances
of double taxation in such cases.
17 Preamble of the Commissioner’s Directive on the Mutual Agreement Procedure
18 Chapter 2, point 3 of the Commissioner’s Directive of the Mutual Agreement Procedure
19 Chapter 2, point 5 of the Commissioner’s Directive on the Mutual Agreement Procedure
20 Chapter 2, point 6 of the Commissioner’s Directive on the Mutual Agreement Procedure
21 MAP Report 2015 of the National Tax Agency, Japan
22 Article 37 of Corporation Tax Act
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Further aspects
Japan already provides timely and complete reporting of MAP statistics. However, there are no
administrative processes in place to publish agreements reached as kind of a best practice.
There are adequate personnel resources deployed for MAP and APAs. Further, the officials in charge of
MAP in Japan have the authority to resolve MAP cases and are in principle not dependent on the
approval of the direction of the tax administration personnel who made the adjustments. Although their
KPIs are not publicly available, the performance indicators of the officials in charge of MAP in Japan is
apparently based on the number of cases solved. It is not based on the amount of sustained audit
adjustments or maintaining tax revenue.
iv. Korea
Korea is an OECD member as well as a member of the G20 and FTA MAP Forum and insofar fully
participating in its work.
Tax treaties
In principle, the Korean tax treaties follow the OECD MTC and Korea has generally implemented
regulations according to Article 25 paragraphs 1 to 3 of the OECD MTC in its tax treaties. Korean tax
treaties generally do not include any provisions for arbitration. Only the tax treaties with Canada and Chile
include a provision for consultation, for which the Council for Trade in Services shall refer the matter to
arbitration. However, arbitration has not been introduced into national law though it is currently under
discussion.
The vast majority of Korea’s treaties contain time limits for the presentation of a MAP case. The time
limits can vary from two to four and half years whereby most treaties provide for a time limit of three
years. Nevertheless, such time limit is restricted to three years even under the domestic tax law23.
Korea’s tax treaties generally provide for a regulation in accordance with Article 9 paragraph 1 and 2 of
the OECD MTC in its tax treaties. MAP access is also provided in case a tax treaty does not explicitly
refer to a rule in accordance with Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC.
The earlier treaty Korea signed with India did not have a provision corresponding to paragraph 2 of Article
9, which restricted the taxpayers’ access to the MAP and bilateral APA in view of the position adopted by
India. However, recently a revised tax treaty has been signed between Korea and India in which the said
provision has been added opening up the route of MAP and bilateral APA for taxpayers.
Domestic tax law
From a domestic tax law perspective, the MAP process is governed by Articles 22-27 of the Act for the
Coordination of International Tax Affairs. Detailed information (e.g., which documents need to be filed
within the application by the taxpayer24) is further outlined in the Presidential Decree of the Act for
Coordination of International Tax Affairs. As such, the MAP process is described clearly and in detail and
the underlying rules and guidelines are published and publicly available.
23 Article 22 paragraph 2 No. 4 of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
24 Article 39 of the Presidential Decree of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
12
Any national, resident or domestic corporation of Korea or any non-resident or foreign corporation having
a place of business in Korea may apply for MAP to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (in case of
application and interpretation of a tax treaty) and to the National Tax Service (NTS) (in case of tax
assessment not coinciding with a tax treaty and in case where a tax adjustment is needed under a tax
treaty25). The Ministry of Strategy and Finance as well as the NTS may terminate ex officio the MAP in
cases when the taxpayer fails to cooperate faithfully with the request for submission of documents under
Article 26 paragraph 1 of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs.
There is no specific timeline mentioned in the tax law for reaching an agreement. From our practical
experience, MAP cases are generally resolved within an average period of two and half years.
Korea provides for bilateral APAs as well as a roll-back of APA to previous years (three years in case of
unilateral APA and five years in case of bilateral APA).
Regarding the domestic route of an appeal, a taxpayer is eligible to file an appeal on the tax assessment
after the conclusion of the MAP – no matter how long the MAP takes to conclude26. In case a MAP is in
effect in conjunction with court proceedings, once the court issues the final decision, the court’s decision
overpowers the MAP. The MAP would end on the date the court decision is issued provided that the MAP
is still in progress27. On the other hand, if the MAP has been concluded prior to the court’s decision, the
MAP would be considered to be non-binding once the court decision is issued and if the terms and
conditions are different from the MAP outcome. 28
There are special regulations available regarding the consideration of interest and penalties as well as
regarding the suspension of collection procedures during a pending MAP case.
Further aspects
Korea’s MAP cases are included in the MAP Statistics of the OECD for 201429 although Korea has
primarily focused on publishing statistics regarding APA. Further, there are no administrative processes in
place to publish agreements reached as kind of a best practice.
There are adequate personnel resources deployed in Korea (the former APA team was split into an APA
and a separate MAP team). Further, the officials in charge of MAP in Korea have the authority to resolve
MAP cases and are in principle not dependent on the approval of the direction of the tax administration
personnel who made the adjustments. Although their KPIs are not publicly available, we understand that
it is apparently based on the number of cases solved and not on the amount of sustained audit
adjustments or maintaining tax revenue.
25 Article 22 paragraph 1 of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
26 Article 24 paragraph 1 of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
27 Article 23 paragraph 4 of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
28 Article 27 paragraph 4 of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs
29 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2014.htm
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v. Indonesia
Indonesia is not an OECD member. It is however, a member of the G20 and FTA MAP Forum and as
such participating in its work on a regular basis.
Tax treaties
Most of Indonesian tax treaties contain regulations similar to Article 25 paragraph 1 to 3 of the OECD
MTC. Indonesian tax treaties do not include any provisions for arbitration except for the treaty with
Mexico. Most of the Indonesian tax treaties include provisions similar to paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9 of
the OECD MTC. MAP access is provided even in cases where a tax treaty does not explicitly refer to a
rule in accordance with Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC.
Domestic tax law
From a domestic tax law perspective, the MAP guidance has been introduced in the Guidelines for
Implementation of MAP dated 22 December 201430. These guidelines aim to renew the existing MAP
process. This was in particular important as there were no guidelines on how the Directorate General of
Taxation (DGT) was to implement agreements arising from these competent authority negotiations. The
new guidelines now reinforce the flexibility for taxpayers to apply for a MAP and to continue domestic
resolution at the same time. This includes applying for a tax objection, appealing to the Court, and
requesting reduction or cancellation of an incorrect tax assessment. A MAP request can no longer be
submitted after the last hearing is concluded by the Tax Court.
According to domestic regulations, MAP cases should generally be resolved within three years. However,
based on our practical experience, past Indonesian MAP cases have been pending resolution for several
years. Only few cases (with Japan and Korea) have been resolved during the past five years.
Indonesia provides for bilateral APAs as well as a roll-back of APA to previous years (subject to certain
conditions). However, an APA does not provide an exemption to the taxpayer from general audits or initial
findings audit. Further, there could also be a possible exchange of notes and information between the
APA and audit teams.
There are no special regulations regarding the suspension of collection procedures available during a
pending MAP case. Rather, the underlying taxes have to be paid in a first place (according to the regular
income tax provisions). There are also no special regulations available regarding the consideration of
interest and penalties in Indonesia in the course of a MAP case.
Further aspects
There are no statistics available in public on MAP cases filed and resolved by the competent authorities
of Indonesia. Further, there are no administrative processes in place to publish agreements reached as
kind of a best practice.
When it comes to adequate personnel resources, it can be stated that the competent authority team is
reasonably skilled and they attend trainings provided by the OECD and other organisations. However,
given the aggressive nature of tax audits in Indonesia, there are several cases that have now reached the
MAP stage, which has made the team a bit stretched. Further, the officials in charge of MAP (Director of
30 Regulation of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia Number 240/PMK.03/2014 (“PMK-240”)
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Tax Regulations II) in Indonesia have the authority to resolve MAP cases. Their KPIs are not publicly
available.
vi. Malaysia
Malaysia is not an OECD member. It is, however, a member of the FTA MAP Forum and as such, it is
participating on a regular basis. On 17 November 2015, during the Commonwealth Association of Tax
Administrators meeting in Malaysia, the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) announced that it has
set up the BEPS Action Committee to act as the coordinating forum to discuss results from various OECD
BEPS meetings, study the implications for domestic law, and provide recommendations to the
Government. The IRBM indicated that they are in the process of reviewing current tax legislation in light
of the OECD’s recommendations. They commented further that not all of the BEPS recommendations
may be relevant to Malaysia, but due to the country’s reliance largely on corporate income tax, they would
closely monitor the relevant BEPS and transfer pricing issues in order to reduce leakages in tax
collection.
Tax treaties
In principle, the Malaysian tax treaties follow the OECD MTC. In particular, Malaysia has not made any
reservations or comments in respect of the MAP article in the OECD MTC and has generally implemented
regulations according to Article 25 paragraphs 1 to 3 of the OECD MTC in its tax treaties. Malaysian tax
treaties generally do not include any provisions for arbitration.
The majority of Malaysia’s tax treaties contain time limits for the presentation of a MAP case (mostly three
years). Where the time limit for presenting a case is not specified in the relevant tax treaty, the Malaysian
competent authority will follow the time limit specified under Article 25 of the OECD MTC (i.e., three years
from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provision of the
convention).
Most of Malaysia’s tax treaties provide for a regulation in accordance with Article 9 paragraph 1 of the
OECD MTC and some of them include a provision similar to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC.
Domestic tax law
From a domestic tax law perspective, the MAP process is rather new. It has been introduced in the MAP
Guidelines dated 5 December 2014. In its introduction, the guideline states that the MAP Article in the
Malaysian tax treaties allows the Malaysian competent authority to interact with competent authorities of
the treaty partners with the intent to resolve international disputes involving double taxation and
inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of a tax treaty. It further allows the Malaysian
competent authority to negotiate bilateral APAs and multilateral APAs with competent authorities of the
treaty partners31. The MAP process is described clearly and in detail and the underlying rules and
guidelines are published. In particular, the guidelines define the typical scenarios requiring competent
authority assistance (transfer pricing, resident status, withholding tax, permanent establishment and
characterisation or classification of income32). It further lists details of how the formal request for MAP (or
bilateral APA / multilateral APA) should be made (e.g., form of application, addressee, relevant
information which needs to be included etc.)33. As no arbitration is available in Malaysia until now, the
31 IRBM Mutual Agreement Procedure Guidelines, PART I Preliminary, 1. Introduction
32 IRBM Mutual Agreement Procedure Guidelines, PART III Administration and Procedure, point 5
33 IRBM Mutual Agreement Procedure Guidelines, PART III Administration and Procedure, point 8
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Malaysian competent authority can terminate the MAP when it is recognised that the continuation of MAP
will not reach any agreement34.
There is no specific timeline mentioned in the tax law for reaching an agreement. Based on our practical
experience, MAP cases are generally solved within a period of one to three years depending on the
nature of the case.
Further, Malaysia provides for a roll-back of APA to previous years (the rules do not specify the maximum
number of years that could be covered under roll-back).
Presenting a case to the Malaysian competent authority to invoke MAP will not deprive a person from its
right for appeal under the Malaysian Income Tax Act. However, while the domestic legal remedies are still
available, the Malaysian competent authority will require that the taxpayer agrees to the suspension of
these remedies if MAP request is accepted35.
There are no specific regulations regarding the suspension of collection procedures available during a
pending MAP case. Rather, the underlying taxes have to be paid in a first place (according to the regular
income tax provisions). Therefore, there are also no specific regulations available regarding the
consideration of interest and penalties in Malaysia in the course of a MAP case.
Further aspects
There are no statistics available in public domain on MAP cases filed and resolved by the competent
authorities of Malaysia. Further, there are no administrative processes in place to publish agreements
reached as kind of a best practice. All information obtained / generated during the MAP process is
protected by the confidentiality provisions of the Income Tax Act and the provision of the applicable tax
treaty.
Adequate personnel resources are available in Malaysia. Further, the officials in charge of MAP in
Malaysia have the authority to resolve MAP cases and are not dependent on the approval of the direction
of the tax administration personnel who made the adjustments. Although their KPIs are not publicly
available, the performance indicators of the staff in charge of MAP in Malaysia are apparently based on
the amount of sustained audit adjustments or maintaining tax revenue.
2.2 EU
Most of the tax treaties within the EU also provide for MAP access in accordance with Article 25
paragraph 1 to 3 of the OECD MTC. However, most of them do not provide for arbitration which stipulates
the avoidance of double taxation.
Within the EU, an additional procedure applies: the EU Arbitration Convention based on Article 293 of the
Treaty on the Foundation of the European Community applicable from 1 January 1995. Such procedure
provides for MAP in phase 1 followed by mandatory arbitration in phase 2 (provided no agreement has
been reached within the MAP process). All EU Member States are obliged – independent of any
34 IRBM Mutual Agreement Procedure Guidelines, PART III Administration and Procedure, point 19.1.6
35 IRBM Mutual Agreement Procedure Guidelines, PART IV Supplemental, 21. Interaction between MAP and
    domestic appeal process
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regulations according to a tax treaty – to avoid any double taxation in case of profit adjustments by EU
Member States36. The legal nature of the arbitration agreement is a multilateral agreement.
The procedure according to Article 6 of the EU Arbitration Convention is limited to the following cases:
· Cases of double taxation regarding transfer pricing adjustments of related parties (Article 9 of the
OECD MTC)
· In case of a profit allocation between the company and its permanent establishment (Article 7 of the
OECD MTC)37)
It is particularly not applicable to any double taxation arising from different interpretation of a tax treaty. In
October 2016, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Council Directive on Double Taxation
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the EU. The Proposed Directive includes a reinforced mandatory
binding dispute resolution mechanism in the EU. The Proposed Directive builds upon the Arbitration
Convention, but seeks to broaden the scope to cover additional areas, beyond transfer pricing and
allocation of profits to permanent establishment, and provides features to address certain identified
shortcomings of the existing process to enhance the enforceability and the effectiveness of the
mechanism.
The MAP process according to Article 6 paragraph 1 sentence 2 of the EU Arbitration Convention
requires that the taxpayer files an application within three years after the first notification of the event
leading to double taxation. If the MAP process does not result in an agreement to eliminate double
taxation within a period of two years, the competent authorities of the countries involved are obliged to
implement an advisory committee (consisting of two independent persons, chairman and representatives
of both countries) for arbitration. The advisory committee has to present its comments on the case within
a period of six months whereby simple majority is sufficient to reach an agreement. The competent
authorities will decide on the elimination of double taxation accordingly.
In contrast to the MAP / arbitration process under the tax treaties, the taxpayer has the right to participate
in the MAP arbitration under the EU Arbitration Convention.
The EU MAP process is rather effective in particular in transfer pricing cases due to the mandatory
binding MAP arbitration. However, there are also some critical points to be mentioned:
· The costs for arbitration (legal, tax advisory costs, and travel costs) as well as the costs for MAP have
to be borne by the taxpayers.
· The agreements made during arbitration or the comments made by the advisory committee could
principally be published with taxpayer’s consent.
· The procedures under the EU Arbitration Convention can be easily suspended due to a pending case
regarding the suspicion of a violation against tax rules.
36 Merz/Sajogo, PIStB, Praxis Internationale Steuerberatung, 8 September 2010, September 2010, page 239
37 Merz/Sajogo, PIStB, Praxis Internationale Steuerberatung, 8 September 2010, September 2010, page 239
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2.3 US
The US is an OECD member as well as a member of the G20 and FTA MAP Forum and insofar fully
participating in its work.
Tax treaties
In principle, the US has generally implemented regulations according to Article 25 paragraphs 1 to 3 of
the OECD MTC in its tax treaties. The US has arbitration clauses in its tax treaties with Germany, France,
Belgium and Canada. The practical experience of the US in relation to arbitration seems to be very
positive (discussed in detail in Para 4.2 of this report). This could be the reason the revised model treaty
released by the US Treasury Department on 17 February 2016 modifies the MAP article to include
mandatory arbitration.
Domestic tax law
From a domestic tax law perspective, the MAP process is regulated in the Procedures for Requesting
Competent Authority Assistance under Tax Treaties38. The process is described with much clarity and in a
very detailed manner. The underlying rules and guidelines are published and publicly available. Further,
the Procedures also define rules for arbitration for cases where the US tax treaty includes an arbitration
clause39. According to these rules, the MAP process will mandatorily lead to arbitration if it has not been
solved within a certain deadline (generally two years).
According to the MAP report for fiscal years up to 2015, the average processing time for the Advance
Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program of the US (cases arising under the business profits and
associated enterprises articles of the US) for 2015 amounts to 27.7 months for the US initiated cases and
to 32.7 months for foreign initiated adjustments40. The average processing time for Treaty Assistance and
Interpretation Team (cases arising under all other treaty articles, including requests for discretionary
determinations under limitation of benefits provisions) amounts to 28.9 months for the US-initiated cases
and to 17.8 months for foreign initiated cases41.
The US provides for bilateral APAs as well as a roll-back of such APA to previous years. It further
provides for so-called Accelerated Competent Authority Procedure (ACAP)42. Under ACAP, a taxpayer
may request that the terms of a competent authority resolution for a given taxable period be extended to
cover subsequent taxable periods for which it has filed tax returns. This is in particular effective, as the
taxpayer does not need to apply for a new MAP for these years but can rely on the first MAP for the
previous years.
Most of the US tax treaties provide that competent authority resolutions are to be implemented by the US
and the treaty partner notwithstanding any time limits or other procedural limitations under the domestic
law of either country43.
38 Rev. Proc. 2015-40, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-15-40.pdf
39 Section 10 Rev. Proc. 2015-40, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-15-40.pdf
40 IRS, Large Business and International Division, CA Statistics latest ones dated April 27, 2016, Table 5
41 IRS, Large Business and International Division, CA Statistics latest ones dated April 27, 2016, Table 9
42 Section 4 Rev. Proc. 2015-40, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-15-40.pdf
43 Section 11 Rev. Proc. 2015-40, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-15-40.pdf
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There are special regulations regarding the suspension of collection procedures during a pending MAP
case whereas there is no specific regulation regarding the consideration of interest and penalties.
Further aspects
The US reports its MAP cases in its MAP Reports on an annual basis44. There are no administrative
processes in place to publish agreements reached as kind of a best practice.
There are adequate personnel resources available in the US. Further, the officials in charge of MAP in the
US have the authority to resolve MAP cases and are principally independent of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) team responsible for making transfer pricing adjustments. They are not influenced insofar,
but may rely on auditors for fact-finding.
2.4 Summary of MAP process in selected countries
Overall, it can be stated that the MAP process is rather new in most of the Asian countries (e.g., Malaysia
and Indonesia) and not as common as for European countries or for the US. Only one country (Japan)
has arbitration introduced in its national tax law. Insofar Japan has the most efficient MAP process of the
selected Asian countries. It fulfils most of the minimum standards and best practices set forth in the report
on Action 14 (e.g., average time frame for resolving a case is 22.4 months, adequate personnel,
consultation process in place in which Japan will inform the other country in case of a rejection of a MAP
application, arbitration etc.). However, Japan’s donation rules and the ineligibility to access MAP in such
cases create uncertainty for taxpayers. Korea and Singapore also have a working MAP process,
however, they have not had implemented arbitration yet. China has developed an MAP process over the
past decade and still needs to increase the headcount of skilled personnel resources responsible for
MAP.
Malaysia has amended its MAP process recently by issuing new guidance so that the MAP process could
work better than in the past. Indonesia also recently issued amended guidelines and we see early signs
of improvements in the MAP process (though there has been a tendency for the tax authorities to argue
on the lines that the subject issues are not covered by the tax treaty but under the domestic law).
44 IRS, Large Business and International Division, CA Statistics latest ones dated April 27, 2016
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3. Analysis of the Action 14 recommendations
Through the adoption of the report on Action 14, countries have agreed to important changes in their
approach to dispute resolution, in particular by having developed a minimum standard with respect to the
resolution of the treaty related disputes, committed to its rapid implementation and agreed to ensure its
effective implementation through the establishment of robust peer-based monitoring mechanism. The
measures developed under Action 14 of the BEPS aim to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of
the MAP process by determining minimum standards, which should be implemented by the countries and
best practices, which would be recommendable to be introduced but are not mandatory.
Additionally, the report recommends adoption of mandatory arbitration for cases that could not be
resolved by way of MAP within a specified time period. A commitment to establish mandatory binding
MAP arbitration - as a way to resolve disputes that otherwise could not be resolved through the MAP –
has only been made by 20 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the US).
3.1 Minimum standards
According to the report on Action 14, implementation of the minimum standards by countries will:
· Ensure that treaty obligations related to the MAP are fully implemented in good faith and that
MAP cases are resolved in a timely manner;
· Ensure the implementation of administrative processes that promote the prevention and timely
resolution of treaty-related disputes; and
· Ensure that taxpayers can access the MAP when eligible.45
3.1.1 Assessment of minimum standards
Essentially, the components of the minimum standards can be allocated to two main areas, namely the
access to MAP and a timely and effective resolution of disputes. Apart from those two broad heads, there
are certain minimum standards relating to the monitoring phase (countries’ participation as the members
of the FTA MAP Forum) and roll-back of the APAs.
i. Access to MAP
As a minimum standard for MAP access, the report on Action 14 requires the countries to implement the
paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 25 OECD MTC in all its tax treaties. One of the key elements is that the
taxpayer needs to present his case to the competent authorities of the Contracting State of which he is
resident within a period of three years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention46. This means that a shorter application period than
three years (which is agreed in several tax treaties all over the world) is not in line with the minimum
standard set forth in Action 14.  A further key element is the consultation procedure according to Article
25 paragraph 3 sentence 2 of the OECD MTC in which the Contracting States may also consult together
for the elimination of double taxation. Such consultation procedure is also defined as part of the minimum
45 Report on Action 14, executive summary
46 Article 25 paragraph 1 sentences 1 and 2 of the OECD MTC
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standard in the report on Action 14. Another key element in this regard, is that the MAP access may not
be restricted by any remedies according to the domestic law of the Contracting States47.
Action 14 of the BEPS further requires as a minimum standard that countries develop and publish rules,
guidelines and procedures for their MAP programmes, which should include guidance on how taxpayers
may make requests for competent authority assistance. Such guidance should be drafted in clear and
plain language and should be readily accessible to the public48. They shall also explain what kind of
information and documentation needs to be attached to a MAP application49. In contrast, the guidance, as
a form of best practice but not part of the minimum standard, determines the relationship of the MAP to
the domestic appeal system or comments on multilateral MAP or interest or penalties50.
Countries should further publish their MAP profiles in a standardised form on a platform of the FTA MAP
Forum.
As part of the minimum standard, it is further required that the country grants access to MAP in particular
in the following cases:
· In transfer pricing cases; to avoid the economic double taxation that may result from the inclusion
of profits of associated enterprises under paragraph 1 of Article 951.
· In case of disagreement between the taxpayer and the tax authority making the adjustment as to
whether the conditions for the application of a treaty anti-abuse provision have been met or as to
whether the application of a domestic law anti-abuse provision is in conflict with the provision of a
treaty52.
As a minimum standard, it is also required that tax audit settlements do not preclude access to MAP.
Where, however, a country has in place an administrative or statutory dispute settlement or resolution
process independent from the audit and examination functions and that can only be accessed through the
request by the taxpayer, that country may limit access to MAP with respect to the matters that have been
resolved with that administrative or statutory process53. In such cases, countries should inform their tax
treaty partners of such processes and address the effects of such processes with respect to the MAP in
their public guidance in order to ensure that taxpayers who choose to make use of such process are fully
informed about the consequences as far as their MAP access is concerned.
Another key element of the minimum standard is that either countries (not only the Contracting State)
have the right to request for MAP according to Article 25 paragraph 1 of the OECD MTC or it is ensured
by way of a notification / consultation procedure that the Contracting State will present the case to the
other State before objecting to the application for MAP54.
47 Article 25 paragraph 1 sentence 1 of the OECD MTC
48 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 2.1
49 Fluechter, IStR, Internationales Steuerrecht, 24/2015, page 943
50 Fluechter, IStR, Internationales Steuerrecht, 24/2015, page 943
51 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 1.1
52 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 1.2
53 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 2.6
54 Fluechter, IStR, Internationales Steuerrecht, 24/2015, page 943
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ii. Timely resolution of MAP
A key element of the minimum standard for the timely resolution of MAP cases is that countries need to
commit to seek to resolve MAP cases within an average time frame of 24 months55. Hereby, the starting
and end date for the calculation of the 24 months period still needs to be determined (as starting date
could, for e.g., be decisive the date of the filing of the first application or – much later – the date at which
the application has been accepted)56. Countries’ progress in meeting this time frame will be periodically
reviewed on the basis of the statistics in accordance with the agreed reporting framework referred to
under element 1.5 of the report on Action 14.
A further requirement under the minimum standard is that the countries should ensure that adequate
resources – including personnel, funding, training and other programme needs – are provided to the MAP
function, in order to enable competent authorities to carry out their mandate to resolve cases of taxation
not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention in a timely and effective manner57. An important
indication for adequate resources seems to be the average time frame for the resolution of the MAP of 24
months being fulfilled58.
For a timely resolution of MAP, it is additionally mentioned that countries’ internal guidance and
procedures for the operation of their MAP programmes should clearly establish that their staff in charge of
MAP processes have the authority to resolve MAP cases in accordance with the terms of the applicable
tax treaty. They should in particular not be dependent on the approval or the direction of the tax
administration personnel who made the adjustments at issue or being influenced by considerations of the
policy that the country would like to see reflected in future amendments to the treaty59.
Another element of the timely resolution of MAP is that countries should not use performance indicators
for their competent authority functions and staff in charge of MAP processes based on the amount of
sustained audit adjustments or maintaining revenue. Appropriate performance indicators could be:
· Number of MAP cases solved;
· Consistency (i.e., a treaty should be applied in a principled and consistent manner to MAP cases
involving the same facts and similarly situated taxpayers); and
· Time taken to resolve a MAP case (recognising that the time taken to resolve a MAP case may
vary according to its complexity and that matters not under the control of a competent authority
may have a significant impact on the time needed to resolve a case).
iii. Monitoring phase – countries’ participation as members of the FTA MAP Forum
The report on Action 14 further requires as part of the minimum standards that the countries should
enhance their competent authority relationships and work collectively to improve the effectiveness of the
MAP by becoming members of the FTA MAP Forum. The FTA is a subsidiary body of the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs and brings together Commissioners from 46 OECD and non-OECD countries
to develop on an equal footing a global response to tax administration in a collaborative fashion60.
55 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 1.3
56 Fluechter, IStR, Internationales Steuerrecht, 24/2015, page 943
57 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 2.5
58 Fluechter, IStR, Internationales Steuerrecht, 24/2015, page 943
59 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 2.3
60 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 1.4
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The report on Action 14 stated that compliance with the minimum standards shall be stringently monitored
whereby the details of such monitoring mechanism would be developed by the FTA MAP Forum. In
accordance with this mandate, on 20 October 2016, the OECD released key documents61, approved by
the Inclusive Framework62 on BEPS that will form the basis of the MAP peer review and monitoring
process under Action 14 of the BEPS. The peer review and monitoring process will be conducted by the
FTA MAP Forum in accordance with the Terms of Reference and Assessment Methodology set out, with
all members participating on an equal footing. This will complement the other BEPS minimum standards
and ensure that taxpayers have access to effective and expedient dispute resolution mechanisms under
bilateral tax treaties.
The Terms of Reference translate the Action 14 minimum standard into 21 elements. These elements
assess a member's legal and administrative framework including the practical implementation of that
framework to determine how its MAP regime performs relative to the 21 elements in the following four key
areas:
· Preventing disputes;
· Availability and access to MAP;
· Resolution of MAP cases; and
· Implementation of MAP agreements.
The Terms of Reference are complemented by 12 best practices which are not part of the minimum
standard and will not affect the assessment.
The Assessment Methodology sets out the two-stage approach for the reviews, which will be conducted
based on the order established by the schedule of reviews. Singapore is included in the third batch, which
will be launched by August 2017. The reviews are driven by peers. However, in recognition that taxpayers
are the main users of the MAP, taxpayers will be invited to provide inputs on specific areas relating to
access to MAP, clarity and availability of MAP guidance and the timely implementation of MAP
agreements.
As part of the monitoring, the FTA MAP Member States shall also provide timely and complete reporting
of MAP statistics pursuant to an agreed reporting framework to be developed in coordination with the FTA
MAP Forum.63
iv. Roll-back of APAs
The minimum standards of the report on Action 14 require availability of roll-back of the bilateral APA to
previous years (subject to applicable time limits) as long as the relevant facts and circumstances in the
earlier tax years are the same (subject to verification of these facts and circumstances on audit64). In
particular, such roll-back may be helpful to prevent or resolve potential / existing transfer pricing disputes.
61 http://www.oecd.org/tax/dispute/beps-action-14-peer-review-and-monitoring.htm
62 The Inclusive Framework brings together over 100 countries and jurisdictions to collaborate on the
implementation of the OECD/ G20 BEPS Package. Under this framework, all state- and non-state jurisdictions that
commit to the BEPS project participate as BEPS Associates of the OECD’s CFA. BEPS Associates have the same
rights and obligations as OECD and G20 countries involved in BEPS work. Every jurisdiction that participates in the
framework as a BEPS Associate will have an equal voice in reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the
BEPS measures.
63 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 1.5
64 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, point 2.7
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3.1.2 Gap analysis – MAP framework in selected Asian countries
We have summarised the gap analysis regarding the minimum standards under Action 14 of the BEPS in
Appendix 1. We would like to highlight the following:
i. Access to MAP
Most of the tax treaties of the selected countries provide for rules in accordance with Article 25 paragraph
1 to 3 of the OECD MTC. However, many of the treaties entered into by these countries provide for a
shorter period than three years for presenting the case to the competent authority. To that extent, the
minimum standard, which requires the countries to allow at least 3 years for presenting the case to the
competent authority is not fulfilled.
All of the selected Asian countries provide MAP access in transfer pricing cases. These countries provide
for MAP access even in case the underlying tax treaty does not have a regulation in accordance with
Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC in place. Accordingly, this minimum standard can be fulfilled by
all selected Asian countries.
Japan, China and Malaysia provide for MAP access in case of a disagreement between the taxpayer and
the competent authority as to whether the conditions for the application of a treaty anti-abuse rule have
been met. No specific regulations exist in Korea and Indonesia. Singapore does not have a special
regulation, however, it can be expected that such access will be accepted.
Japan and China also provide for MAP access in case of a disagreement between the taxpayer and the
competent authority as to whether the conditions for the application of a domestic anti-abuse rule conflict
with the provisions of a treaty. For Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, no special regulation is in place.
Singapore does not have a special regulation, albeit as unlikely as it seems. With regards to this,
Singapore, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia should revisit their positions and probably come with
necessary clarifications.
All the selected Asian countries have already developed and published rules and guidelines for their MAP
programmes under their national tax law. This guidance already includes information about how the
taxpayers may make requests for competent authority assistance and which information and
documentation needs to be attached to a MAP application. To that extent, all the selected Asian countries
seem to fulfil the minimum standards.
ii. Timely resolution of MAP
As part of the minimum standards, the average time frame for resolving a MAP should principally not
exceed a period of 24 months. Singapore (24 months) and Japan (22.4 months65) seem to generally be
able to meet this deadline. China (two years or longer), Korea (two and half years) and Malaysia (one to
three years) also seem to not deviate too far away from this time frame. Indonesia is, however, quite far
behind in meeting this time frame. Indonesia is also a country where the MAP process doesn’t seem to be
working efficiently and thus, there seems to be a direct link between the average time frame for resolving
a MAP and an effective MAP process.
65 MAP Report 2015 of the National Tax Agency, Japan
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Most of the selected Asian countries have already built up people resources, though China needs to build
up additional resources. Indonesia seems to have the biggest issue in this respect, which is also an
indication for the long average time frame for Indonesia to resolve MAP cases.
For most of the selected Asian countries (except for China), the officials in charge of MAP processes
have the authority to resolve MAP cases in accordance with the terms of the tax treaty and they are not
dependent on the approval of the direction of the tax administration personnel.
It is difficult to get more information regarding the performance indicators for the competent authority
functions and officials in charge of the MAP processes as this information is usually not publicly available.
There is a tendency for the KPIs to be based on the number of resolved cases than sustained audit
adjustments.
iii. Monitoring phase – countries’ participation as members of the FTA MAP Forum
All the selected Asian countries are members of the FTA MAP Forum and they participate in its work on a
regular basis.
Stage 1 peer review schedule released by OECD on 31 October 201666 includes review of all the
selected Asian countries except Malaysia (since Malaysia is not a member of the Inclusive Framework).
With respect to the reporting of MAP statistics, only Japan is fully compliant as yet. China and Korea have
recently been included in the OECD statistics and Singapore has just started to publish MAP and APA
statistics whereas for Malaysia and Indonesia there are no statistics available.
iv. Roll-back of APAs
All selected Asian countries provide for a roll-back in case of BAPAs and thus, are compliant with the
minimum standard.
3.2 Best practices
3.2.1 Assessment of best practices
In addition to the minimum standards, which have to be mandatorily implemented, Action 14 of the BEPS,
has determined a series of so-called “best practices”. Such best practices are not obligatory but can be
seen as recommendations. While the minimum standards reflect consensus by the participating countries
to take specific measures that are aimed at resolving treaty-based disputes in a timely manner, the “best
practices” have not been approved by all G20 and OECD countries. The best practices generally have a
more subjective and qualitative character, but reflect the OECD’s concern that these issues ought to be
addressed to improve the functioning of the MAP process.
66 https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-action-14-peer-review-assessment-schedule.pdf
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The best practices can be grouped under the broad level themes of the minimum standards:
1) Ensure that treaty obligations related to the mutual agreement
procedure are fully implemented in good faith and that MAP
cases are resolved in a timely manner.
Best practice 1
2) Ensure the implementation of administrative processes that
promote the prevention and timely resolution of treaty-related
disputes.
Best practices 2 to 5
3) Ensure that taxpayers can access the MAP when eligible. Best practices 6 to 11
The best practices recommended are discussed in the following paragraphs:
Best practice 1: Inclusion of Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC in tax treaties
Most countries consider that the economic double taxation resulting from the inclusion of profits of
associated enterprises under Article 9 paragraph 1 of the OECD MTC is not in accordance with the object
and purpose of tax treaties and falls within the scope of the MAP under Article 2567 of the OECD MTC.
However, some countries (e.g., India) argue that in the absence of a treaty provision in accordance with
Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC, they are neither obliged to make corresponding adjustments or
to grant MAP access with respect to the economic double taxation that may otherwise result from a
primary transfer pricing adjustment. It is recommended as a best practice for countries to provide in their
tax treaties, a clause for tax authorities to provide for a “corresponding unilateral adjustment” (as under
Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC) in cases which they find the objection of the taxpayer to be
justified.
Best practice 2: Publishing selected MAP resolutions
The report suggests that countries should have appropriate procedures in place to publish mutual
agreements, which relate to general matters that affect the application of a treaty to all taxpayers or to a
category of taxpayers (rather than to a specific taxpayer’s MAP case). Such guidance should be useful to
prevent future disputes and to reinforce consistent application of bilateral tax treaties, with appropriate
provisions to protect the confidentiality of the taxpayers.
Best practice 3: Training the competent authority personnel in terms of MAPs by using FTA
training material
The report also recommends that countries should develop “global awareness” of the audit / examination
functions involved in international matters through the delivery of the FTA’s “Global Awareness Training
Module” to their personnel. Not only will this assist in addressing challenges faced by competent
authorities with respect to resources, empowerment, relationships and posture, process improvements,
relationship with the audit function and responsibility and accountability, but also prevent dysfunctional tax
administration behaviours.
67 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, number 43
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Best practice 4: Countries should implement bilateral APA programmes
APAs concluded bilaterally between treaty partner competent authorities provide an increased level of
certainty in both jurisdictions, lessen the likelihood of double taxation and may proactively prevent transfer
pricing disputes68. Accordingly, the report recommends the countries to implement bilateral APA
programmes.
It is interesting to note that while the implementation of an APA programme has only become part of the
best practices in the report on Action 14, the roll-back of such APA programme – provided that the
country has already implemented an APA programme – is part of the minimum standards.
Best practice 5: Application of MAPs for several years
The issue raised for a MAP request may often be a recurring one, across several tax years. Countries
may thus allow a taxpayer to request a single MAP assistance for several tax years for such recurring
issues – subject to the requirement that the relevant facts and circumstances are the same and subject to
the verification of such facts and circumstances. This will help to avoid duplicative MAP requests and
permit a more efficient use of competent authority resources.
Best practice 6: Suspension of tax collection procedures
Where the payment of tax is a requirement for MAP access, the taxpayer concerned may face significant
financial difficulties: if both Contracting States collect the dispute taxes, double taxation will in fact occur
and the resulting cash flow problems may have a substantial impact on a taxpayer’s business, at least for
as long as it takes to resolve the MAP case69. Moreover, “good faith” discussions would be compromised
if countries may have to refund taxes already collected. The report on Action 14 thus recommends that
countries should suspend tax collection procedures during the period a MAP case is pending, under the
same conditions as applicable to a person pursuing a domestic administrative or judicial remedy.
Best practice 7: Implement appropriate administrative measures that choice of remedies
                         remains with taxpayer
A taxpayer’s choice of recourse is generally only constrained by applicable time limits (such as those
provided by a domestic law statute of limitation). In addition, tax administrations would typically not deal
with a taxpayer’s case through both the MAP and a domestic court or administrative proceeding at the
same time (i.e., one process will generally take precedence over the other). The report on Action 14 thus
recommends that countries should implement appropriate measures to facilitate recourse to the MAP to
resolve treaty-related disputes (being a comprehensive bilateral resolution of a case), recognising the
general principle that the choice of remedies should remain with the taxpayer70.
Best practice 8: Publish guidance on relationship between MAP and domestic law administrative
                         and judicial remedies
In order to resolve the uncertainty as a result of the complex interaction between domestic law and MAP,
countries should include in their published regular MAP guidance -- requested as part of the minimum
standards, an explanation of the relationship between the MAP and domestic law administrative and
judicial remedies. This may include guidance on the processes involved and the conditions, rules and
68 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, para 30
69 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, para 50
70 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, para 51
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deadlines associated with these processes. The guidance should specifically address whether the
competent authority considers itself to be legally bound to follow a domestic court decision in the MAP or
whether the competent authority will not deviate from a domestic court decision as a matter of
administrative policy or practice.
Best practice 9: MAP in case of self-initiated adjustments
Under the laws of some states, a taxpayer may be permitted under appropriate circumstances, to amend
a previously filed tax return to adjust the price for a controlled transaction between associated
enterprises, or to adjust the profits attributable to a permanent establishment, in order to reflect a result in
accordance (in the view of the taxpayer) with the arm’s length principle71. For such purposes, the report
on Action 14 recommends that MAP access be allowed to taxpayers to avoid double taxation that may
arise in such cases of bona fide taxpayer-initiated foreign adjustments permitted under the domestic laws
of a treaty partner.
Best practice 10: Guidance on the treatment of interest and penalties
The report on Action 14 further recommends that countries’ published MAP guidance should provide
guidance on the consideration of interest and penalties in the MAP process.
Best practice 11: Guidance on multilateral MAPs and APAs
While the MAP process provided for in Article 25 of the OECD MTC has traditionally focused on the
resolution of bilateral disputes, phenomena such as the adoption of regional and global business models
and the accelerated integration of national economies and markets have emphasised the need for
effective mechanisms to resolve multi-jurisdictional tax disputes72. As a consequence, the report on
Action 14 recommends that countries should also include guidelines on multilateral MAPs and APAs in
their published guidance.
3.2.2 Gap analysis – MAP framework in selected Asian countries
We have summarised the gap analysis regarding the best practices under Action 14 the BEPS in
Appendix 2. We would like to highlight the following points:
Inclusion of Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC in tax treaties
Singapore and all of the selected Asian countries have included a regulation in accordance with Article 9
paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC in the majority of their tax treaties. Even in case a tax treaty does not
provide for a regulation similar to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC, none of the selected Asian
countries denies MAP access in transfer pricing cases for this reason.
However, there have been countries (for example, India), which take a position that MAP and bilateral
APAs are not possible with a treaty partner in the absence of a provision corresponding to Article 9
paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC. In order to avoid conflicting positions, it could be recommended to
include a regulation similar to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the OECD MTC in all of the tax treaties. It is
noteworthy that Korea has recently signed a revised treaty with India, with addition of a provision similar
to Article 9 paragraph 2 as one of the major changes. Similarly, Singapore has recently signed a Protocol
71 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, para 54
72 Report on Action 14, I. Minimum standard, best practices and monitoring process, para 58
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with India on 30 December 2016 which seeks to amend Article 9 of the treaty to add a provision similar to
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the OECD MTC.
Publishing selected MAP resolutions
None of the selected Asian countries currently publishes agreements reached in a MAP process as a kind
of best practice. (Only China publishes basic information of APAs reached during the year.)
Bilateral APA programmes
All selected countries (including Singapore) have already implemented bilateral APA programmes and
are compliant with the best practices of Action 14.
Application of MAPs for several years
Most of the selected Asian countries permit that taxpayers can request for a multi-year resolution through
MAP of recurring issues (except for Indonesia, where there is no specific regulation in place) and are
insofar compliant with the best practices set forth in the report for Action 14.
Measures to provide for suspension of collection
Japan, Korea and the US have measures in place that provide for suspension of the collection of the
underlying taxes in the course of a MAP process so that the taxpayer does not have to face cash flow
issues. In contrast to this, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have no such rules in effect and are not
compliant with the best practices in this respect. It is recommendable for Singapore, Indonesia and
Malaysia to amend their guidance and include clear regulations on the suspension of tax payment
collections in order to prevent taxpayers from facing cash flow issues.
Relationship between MAP and domestic remedies
Analysis of the regulations applicable in the selected countries (including Singapore) shows that in terms
of the relationship between MAP and domestic law administrative and judicial remedies, all selected
countries have guidance in this respect. In most countries, domestic legal remedies have to be
suspended if a MAP needs be applied for.
MAP in case of self-initiated adjustments
A comparison of the regulations in the selected countries (including Singapore) shows that the regulations
are clear only in the US and Korea. In both countries, MAPs are allowed in case of self-initiated
adjustments. In all other countries (including Singapore) a possibility of a MAP application in such cases
is not clearly defined, though the MAP rules mainly refer to double taxation caused by a tax audit. With
respect to corresponding adjustments, Singapore transfer pricing guidelines state that such adjustments
will not be allowed post-filing of income-tax return unless it is done under MAP.
The main goal of the Action 14 report is to resolve double taxation incurred due to income adjustments in
one country. However, it can be stated that most of the selected countries do not comply with the best
practice recommendations insofar. Therefore, it is advisable to review the current practice in terms of self-
initiated adjustments. From a taxpayer’s perspective, clear guidance on whether self-initiated adjustments
are subject to a MAP is preferred.
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Guidance regarding interest and penalties
In terms of the treatment of interest and penalties in the course of a MAP process, none of the countries
analysed have a guidance in this respect. It is recommendable for countries to include specific guidance
addressing the interest and penalty considerations for MAP process.
3.3 Mandatory arbitration
The business community in general and a number of countries consider that mandatory binding
arbitration is the best way of ensuring that tax treaty disputes are effectively resolved through MAP73.
However, the countries involved in the BEPS discussion have not reached consensus on the adoption of
arbitration as a mandatory mechanism to ensure an effective procedure in terms of MAP processes. A
problem that the OECD faces is that several key countries will not entertain the possibility of mandatory
and binding arbitration. During the discussions, some governments raised issues on whether mandatory
arbitration would be contrary to their constitutions and would reduce their fiscal sovereignty; other raised
issues concerning the institutional framework within which arbitration would take place, the process of
selecting arbitrators and resolving cases74. India, for example, would struggle with such proposals
because the federal structure is unsuitable – binding local authorities would be almost impossible for the
central authorities in Delhi to keep up with75. There were also concerns on the part of developing
countries about the cost of arbitration76.
As a consequence, arbitration has neither become part of the minimum standards nor the best practices
in the final report on Action 14. Only a few countries have committed to introduce mandatory binding
arbitration as a way to resolve disputes, which could not be solved within a MAP process upfront. The
countries that have expressed interest in doing so include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US77. These countries collectively account for more than
90% of the outstanding MAP cases at the end of 201378.
With respect to the design of the arbitration, the report on Action 14 does not provide any details. It only
states that a mandatory binding MAP arbitration provision would be developed as part of the negotiation
of the multilateral instrument envisaged by Action 15 of the BEPS79. The text of the multilateral
instrument, released by OECD in November 2016, includes a chapter on arbitration. This has been
discussed in detail in section 5 of this report.
73 Report on Action 14, II. Commitment to mandatory binding MAP arbitration, para 62
74 Univ.-Prof. Dr h.c. Michael Lang / Prof. Dr Jeffrey Owens in International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU
    Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law, Preface
75 Joe Stanley-Smith, International Tax Review dated 24 February 2015, OECD looking for a way forward on
    arbitration
76 Univ.-Prof. Dr h.c. Michael Lang / Prof. Dr Jeffrey Owens in International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU
    Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law, Preface
77 Report on Action 14, II. Commitment to mandatory binding MAP arbitration, para 62
78 Report on Action 14, II. Commitment to mandatory binding MAP arbitration, para 62
79 Report on Action 14, II. Commitment to mandatory binding MAP arbitration, para 63
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Analysis of the selected Asian countries shows that none of them provide for a mandatory arbitration
programme in their tax treaties with Asian countries. Japan is the only country with a mandatory binding
arbitration process in place (with selected European countries)80.
3.4 Concluding remarks and our recommendations
Monitoring implementation and the impact of the different BEPS measures is a key element of the work
ahead. The OECD has established an Inclusive Framework on BEPS, which allows interested countries
and jurisdictions to work with the OECD and G20 members on developing standards on BEPS-related
issues and reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the whole BEPS Package. In October 2016,
the OECD released key documents, approved by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS that will form the
basis of the MAP peer review and monitoring process under Action 14. The peer review and monitoring
process will be conducted by the FTA MAP Forum in accordance with the Terms of Reference and
Assessment Methodology, with all members participating on an equal footing. The key objective of the
monitoring and peer review of a jurisdiction’s compliance with the minimum standard is to help the
jurisdiction identify areas where it can improve to achieve an efficient and effective MAP process. In this
regard, it is important for both the FTA MAP Forum and the assessed jurisdiction to follow up on the
recommendations in the Stage 1 Peer Review report to address the shortcomings identified and to
publicly acknowledge progress made by the assessed jurisdiction.
Singapore has been included in the third batch (to be launched by August 2017) in the assessment
schedule for Stage 1 Peer Reviews. Comparing the recommendations set forth in the final report on
Action 14 (both the minimum standards as well as the best practices) with the current MAP practice in
Singapore, it can be seen that the current regulations issued by Singapore’s government fulfil a majority
of the minimum requirements in terms of MAP proceedings. With respect to the best practices, it can be
seen that the current rules published by the IRAS already comply with many of the recommendations.
However, four important aspects are currently not yet covered.
The first aspect relates to the treatment of self-initiated adjustments and the taxpayer’s right to apply for a
MAP in this respect. For multinational groups, it is important to have clarity in this respect as self-initiated
income adjustments are often necessary, for e.g., to reflect agreements of a tax audit in another country.
From a taxpayer’s perspective, it is important to have access to MAP as the cases of self-initiated
adjustments are common and they also give rise to economic double taxation.
Second, to allow taxpayers to make use of Article 25 of the OECD MTC, and in particular paragraph 1
(presenting a case within the specified timeline to the competent authority of the state of which the
taxpayer is resident), the minimum standard requires that countries make sure that both competent
authorities are aware of MAP requests that are filed. This means that a taxpayer should be able to file a
request in either of the Contracting States, which would require an amendment to the current wording of
Article 25 paragraph 1; alternatively, a bilateral notification or consultation process would need to be
implemented to allow the other competent authority to be informed in case one competent authority
considers the taxpayer’s objection not justified.
Third, in line with the prescribed best practices, it is recommendable for Singapore to amend its guidance
and include clear regulations on the suspension of tax payment collections (because of which, taxpayers
80 Overview of tax treaties with arbitration clauses in International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for
    Austrian and International Tax Law, Annex in Chapter 2 to point 2.6
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have to face cash flow issues) and also the relevant guidance on consideration of interest and penalties
in the MAP.
Lastly, Singapore needs to consider the possibility of adopting mandatory arbitration as part of its dispute
resolution policy. There are several considerations to be taken into account of while analysing the need
for mandatory arbitration, which will be discussed in the next section of this report.
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4. Mandatory arbitration – a critical analysis from Singapore’s perspective
4.1 Need for Singapore to revisit its dispute resolution policy
The existing MAP provides a generally effective and efficient method of resolving international tax
disputes. However, there will inevitably be cases in which the MAP is not able to reach a satisfactory
result81. The inability of the current MAP to provide for all steps possible to facilitate a final resolution of
issues arising under treaties was pointed out by both private sector representatives and tax officials as
one of the principal obstacles to ensure an effective MAP. It causes taxpayers to hesitate in making the
resource commitment to enter into the MAP and likewise provides no incentive to competent authorities to
take all steps necessary to ensure a speedy resolution of the issues involved.82
The problem of economic double taxation can commonly be seen in transfer pricing cases. Inland
Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) published Singapore’s first transfer pricing guidelines in 2006 (a
decade after the OECD had published its guidelines in 1995). Nevertheless, the IRAS has maintained
that it has applied the arm’s length principle all along, particularly through Singapore’s tax treaties.
Indeed, the arm’s length principle had existed from as early as 1963 in Article 9 of the OECD’s MTC. The
Article and its subsequent revisions have generally been adopted in the tax treaties concluded by
Singapore. The arm’s length principle is also present in Article 7 in respect of attributing profits to a
permanent establishment.
Arising from its tax treaty obligations, there were a number of transfer pricing cases even prior to 2006, in
particular, cases filed under the MAP Article of the relevant tax treaty. The IRAS could be said to have
started building up its transfer pricing expertise from these early MAP cases. In our experience, for these
cases the Singapore taxpayer would have sought redress with the IRAS for upward transfer pricing
adjustments made by the other treaty country instead of the other way round. A number of these MAP
cases also progressed to be bilateral APA cases concluded between the IRAS and its treaty partners.
The IRAS’ early experience with transfer pricing-related MAPs and APAs could be the main reason why
Singapore’s first transfer pricing guidelines issued in 2006 had a strong emphasis on the need for
Singapore taxpayers to be aware of and maintain transfer pricing documentation in the event that they
require the IRAS’ assistance in a MAP or APA. Singapore has come a long way since its first encounters
with transfer pricing. Since its first experiences with APAs, the IRAS has now concluded more than 50
APAs, the majority of which are bilateral APAs.
In terms of the experience of MAP framework in Singapore, one can see that the majority of cases being
discussed under MAP relate to transfer pricing. The average time taken by Singapore for dispute
resolution under MAP is 24 months, which is in line with global standards as well as the Action 14
recommendations. While, in our experience, the success rate for resolution of disputes by MAP process is
quite high for Singapore; a limited team size and consequent longer time period involved in dispute
resolution is something that can be improved. Lack of cooperation and a longer time period taken by the
competent authorities of some countries have often been cited as a challenge by the IRAS, which hinders
the effectiveness of the MAP process. Further, one needs to bear in mind the possibility of increase in
disputes in the area of international taxation in the post-BEPS world given the likelihood of different
interpretations and scope by different countries for new and novel measures proposed under the BEPS.
81 OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Improving the resolution of tax treaty disputes, February 2007,
    Chapter A. No. 10
82 OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Improving the resolution of tax treaty disputes, February 2007,
    Chapter A. No. 11
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Therefore, undoubtedly, every country needs to revisit its dispute resolution policy to ensure that the
adoption of the BEPS measures is supported by an effective, certain and time-bound dispute resolution
framework. Adoption of a mandatory arbitration provision could be a potential solution for the challenges
faced by Singapore in the MAP process in terms of lack of co-operation by treaty partner or uncertain
positions relating to the new unique issues arising out of the BEPS.
With this background, this section of the report seeks to analyse the arbitration as dispute resolution
mechanism from Singapore’s perspective.
4.2 Practical experience of the arbitration proceedings in other countries
Singapore has established an investor-friendly business environment and attracted many international
investors. In order to maintain this status, it will be of particular importance for Singapore to position itself
as a country that is adaptable to new measures and proposals in order to mitigate economic double
taxation. One way to mitigate the risk of economic double taxation could be to have an effective MAP
process in place, which guarantees effective resolution of the disputes. Singapore has MAP provision
included in all of its tax treaties. However, arbitration has been agreed upon only in its tax treaty with
Mexico. It has neither practical experience insofar nor has implemented arbitration in its domestic tax law.
For the assessment on whether it makes sense for Singapore to agree on mandatory binding arbitration
clauses in its tax treaties, the practical experiences of other countries could be taken into account.
US
The US has entered into four tax treaties / protocols to provide for mandatory arbitration of certain cases
in the MAP, namely Germany, Belgium, Canada and France. Separately, the competent authorities of the
US and the above-mentioned four countries (i.e., Germany, Belgium, Canada and France) recently
signed an arrangement regarding the application of the arbitration procedure. The purpose of the
arrangement, as stated, is to provide guidance under which the arbitration procedure will operate.
For a MAP case to go to an arbitration panel, the US tax treaties require that the relevant taxpayers agree
to arbitration and the release of their information to the arbitrators. They also require that both the
taxpayers and their authorised representatives make certain agreements regarding confidentiality of the
arbitration process. To indicate these agreements, the US IRS has developed three documents for
taxpayers and representatives to sign.
a. Taxpayer Consent to MAP Arbitration and Nondisclosure Statement
By signing this document, the US taxpayer and members of its consolidated group establish their
consent to the competent authorities using MAP arbitration to resolve their case. In signing the
document, the taxpayer and other concerned persons agree that they will not disclose information
received in connection with the arbitration proceeding, other than the final arbitrated determination.
b. Nondisclosure Statement of Taxpayer’s Authorised Representative
Treaty arbitration provisions, e.g., Article 25(5)(c) and 25(6)(d) of the US-Germany treaty, require
each representative of each of the taxpayers involved to agree not to disclose information about an
arbitration, which is indicated when they execute this document.  This applies to both the US and to
foreign representatives.
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c. Taxpayer Authorisation to Disclose Tax Information for Purposes of Treaty MAP Arbitration
Proceedings
By signing this document, the US taxpayer and members of its consolidated group consent to the
disclosure of taxpayer information to non-governmental employees or organisations, which may or
will be involved in the arbitration proceeding, most importantly the arbitrators themselves.
The US uses the services of an external dispute resolution organisation, the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), to expedite some of the administrative tasks of MAP arbitration. The contract
with the US IRS requires ICDR to provide confidentiality to taxpayer information. By signing the above
documents, the taxpayer also consents to IRS’ use of the services of ICDR and disclosure by ICDR to
arbitrators and potential arbitrators, as necessary, to obtain and use their services.  The treaty partners
involved in MAP arbitration may also use the services of ICDR or a similar organisation.
While there is limited public information available regarding the experience of the US relating to
mandatory arbitration, tax consultants and academics have indicated successful and satisfying outcomes
of the policy. The academics in the US consider the adoption of mandatory arbitration by the US as the
most significant treaty policy in recent years. This was evident from the comments made by Professor
Rosenbloom83 at a conference organised by Singapore Management University Centre for Excellence in
Taxation in September 201584. To Professor Rosenbloom, the essential goal of having mandatory
arbitration provisions in the US tax treaties was to have no arbitration at all. More specifically, the
mandatory arbitration provision was to act mainly as a deterrent measure for treaty partners to resolve
MAP cases in a fair and efficient way without the need for any external intervention such as arbitration.
Professor Rosenbloom observed that the deterrence seemed to have some effect in the US, as there had
been no arbitration case thus far involving the US and Germany, Belgium and France. Professor
Rosenbloom also mentioned that there were currently three more US tax treaties with Switzerland, Japan
and Spain, which incorporated the mandatory arbitration provision but the protocols amending those
treaties were pending domestic approval in the US.
Based on his experience and having been involved in some arbitration cases in the US, Professor
Rosenbloom seemed extremely satisfied with the process, which to him had worked efficiently and was
inexpensive. To him, the secret to the US’ success with mandatory arbitration lies in its adoption of the
baseball or last-best-offer methods of arbitration. Under that mechanism, the arbitration panel has no
authority to deviate from the positions put up by the two countries involved in the arbitration and that itself
is an enormous incentive for countries to take reasonable positions in a MAP case. The baseball method
of arbitration is also not much of an incursion to the sovereign rights of countries as it does not allow the
arbitration panel to take an independent position on the MAP issue that is different from the positions put
up by the countries (discussed in details in Para 4.4 of this report).
83 Director, International Tax Program,  New York University School of Law
84 Summary of the proceedings of the conference available at https://accountancy.smu.edu.sg/cet/tax-disputes-
and-role-map-and-arbitration
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According to Prof H. David Rosenbloom, some complicated MAP cases, which had resisted resolution for
years, were concluded once it became clear that there would be a mandatory arbitration provision in a
particular treaty85. Thus, he mentioned that arbitration has been beneficial in hastening the resolution of
complex matters by the competent authorities.
He also mentioned that it is not clear that any actual arbitrations have occurred under the US treaties with
Belgium, Germany or France as there have been no public pronouncements to that effect. However, he
mentioned that there have been arbitrations under the treaty with Canada. The number is not certain —
accounts range from three to eight — but it appeared that the decision in each instance had been made
in favour of the US86. Prof H. David Rosenbloom concluded in his paper that the arbitration under the US
treaties is a means of reaching a resolution within the MAP.
It is also noteworthy that the revised model tax treaty released by the US Treasury Department on 17
February 2016 modified the MAP article to include mandatory arbitration.
UK
The UK began to incorporate provision for arbitration in its tax treaties as a policy from 201187 (at least if
the other negotiating party is willing to agree to it) and it can now be found in a number of its tax treaties
(such as France, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway etc.). Out of these, many of the treaties
preclude the availability of arbitration where a decision on the subject issues has already been rendered
by a court or administrative tribunal of either treaty partner state. However, as a policy, the UK seeks,
when agreeing to treaties, to have terms that are more favourable to the taxpayer, where possible88. For
example, the UK’s treaties with Bahrain and Qatar do not have any such restriction relating to decision by
a court or administrative tribunals which blocks the access to arbitration. Further, these treaties provide
for a time-limit of three years for the competent authorities of the two countries to resolve the issues
before it goes for arbitration (as against the time-limit of two years prescribed in most of the treaties). An
inference could be that the respective governments of these countries wish to encourage the competent
authorities to resolve the issues at MAP level highlighting the “threat” of access to arbitration.
Canada
Canada has only one bilateral tax treaty (with the US) with a mandatory binding arbitration clause in
operation89. Because of the non-disclosure agreements in the Canada-US Memorandum of
85 Paper submitted to Vienna University of Economic and Business available at:
https://www.wu.ac.at/fileadmin/wu/d/i/taxlaw/institute/WU_Global_Tax_Policy_Center/Arbitration/12_article__
_arbitration_of_disputes_pursuant_to_tax_treaties__the_experience_of_the_united_states.pdf
86 Paul Mulvihill & Steven Wrappe, “Arbitration in Tax Treaties: The Canada-United States Income Tax Convention,”
Corporate Bus. Tax Monthly (Mar. 1, 2012).
87 Policy Paper - Statement of Practice 1 (2011)- updated 5 April 2016 – issued by HMRC
88 Policy Paper - Statement of Practice 1 (2011)- updated 5 April 2016 – issued by HMRC
89 Canada has also signed An Agreement concerning the application of the arbitration provisions of the Convention
between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital (the “Convention”), which was concluded through an exchange of notes dated July 27, 2015 and
August 11, 2015.  Canada and the UK will notify each other of the completion of their respective procedures that
are necessary for the entry into force of the Agreement. The Agreement will enter into force and have effect on
the date of the later of these notifications.
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Understanding, no official statistics concerning the number of cases referred for mandatory arbitration, or
how they were decided, have been publicly released. Generally speaking, the reaction of taxpayers and
tax professionals to the availability of arbitration has been quite positive.
Challenges based on the practical experiences in the above countries
While adoption of mandatory arbitration as a “last resort” has delivered positive outcomes, one should
also note the challenges experienced in the above countries.
· There has been a tendency for the competent authorities to use a good portion of the full two
years to negotiate a MAP case, as the threat of arbitration and brinkmanship play out during this
period.
· The competent authorities often either jointly request more time from the taxpayer (to extend
discussions past the two-year time frame) or agree to adjust the commencement date to allow the
competent authorities more time.
· Sometimes the settlements on the verge of arbitration (completion of the two / three years, as
specified) are not always the “best” resolutions what was expected or would have been predicted.
· Lastly, the institutional framework within which arbitration would take place, the process of
selecting arbitrators and resolving cases could be time consuming.
Having regards to the above challenges and handful of treaties with mandatory arbitration, one could
raise doubts regarding the benefits of a mandatory arbitration clause. However, the experience in general
in the above countries and others with mandatory binding arbitration have shown that the simple
availability (or “threat”) of arbitration has improved the speed with which MAP cases are resolved by the
two competent authorities. The competent authorities are encouraged to settle tax disputes within the
regular MAP process without going into arbitration. This can be seen in particular for the final offer
arbitration approach as the arbitrators are forced to choose one of the two presented options (“all or
nothing” approach). There is no possibility insofar to find a compromise in between the two presented
solutions. In summary, the fear of a mandatory binding arbitration at the end of a MAP process may
support an effective and efficient MAP process.
4.3 Recommendations from Singapore’s perspective
From an industry perspective, an efficient dispute resolution mechanism is of utmost importance to
address the possible disputes and conflicts that could arise in the post-BEPS world. There is a need for a
strong “link” between the BEPS measures under the various Action plans and the dispute resolution
mechanisms that are available to taxpayers. Whenever the parties are not able to reach an agreement
within a reasonable time frame (e.g., two years), there is no better way to reach the resolution of the case
than by mandatory binding arbitration. Further, the fact that there is a mandatory binding arbitration for
the case that the mutual agreement negotiations fail has a positive side effect that states more often find
solutions in the preceding mutual agreement discussions. If there is a “threat” of involving a third party in
order to reach the final decision (as in case of mandatory binding arbitration), it may help to motivate the
competent authorities to cooperate better and reach agreement in a pre-arbitration phase.
Canada also has entered into tax treaties with certain other countries with a mandatory arbitration provision (such
as Switzerland and France) but the said provision is yet to be given effect by way of exchange of diplomatic notes.
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The MAP can thus be improved by supplementing it with additional dispute resolution techniques such as
mandatory arbitration to help resolve issues, which have prevented the countries from reaching an
agreement in a MAP. The very existence of the mandatory arbitration can encourage greater use of the
MAP since both governments and taxpayers will know at the outset that the time and effort put into the
MAP will likely produce a satisfactory result90.
Further, considering that Singapore already has an established international arbitration centre, adoption
of mandatory arbitration in tax matters only makes sense and it would also help Singapore to specialise in
arbitration for tax disputes or even develop a tax arbitration hub.
With these recommendations for Singapore to consider adoption of mandatory arbitration as part of its
dispute resolution policy, we have provided an overview of the different arbitration approaches and the
key considerations to be taken into account while designing an effective arbitration model in the following
sections of this report.
4.4 Different arbitration approaches
From a purely legal and conventional standpoint, countries have a wide choice of models and frameworks
for conducting arbitration in tax matters. The most commonly used arbitration models include:
· Arbitration according to the OECD Model
· Arbitration according to the UN Model
· Arbitration according to the EU Arbitration Convention
· Baseball arbitration
i. Arbitration according to the OECD Model
According to Article 25 paragraph 5 of the OECD MTC, a taxpayer can request that any unresolved
issues be submitted to arbitration provided that such case has been presented to the competent authority
of a Contracting State under Article 25 paragraph 1 of the OECD MTC and the competent authorities are
unable to reach an agreement to resolve that case within two years from the presentation of the case to
the competent authority of the other Contracting State.
According to Article 25 paragraph 5 sentence 2 of the OECD MTC, these unresolved issues shall not,
however, be submitted to arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been rendered by a court or
administrative tribunal of either states. Further, the arbitrated agreement is binding for the tax authorities
involved and must be implemented unless the taxpayer files an objection and rejects the agreement
reached (Article 25 paragraph 5 sentence 3 of the OECD MTC).
The arbitration process, according to the OECD MTC, comprises several steps, which are briefly
described in the following. The OECD MTC itself does not include these procedural regulations; rather,
they are set forth in the Commentary to the OECD MTC91 (in particular in the Annex: Sample Mutual
Agreement on Arbitration). Competent authorities are, of course, free to modify, add or delete any
provisions of the sample agreement when concluding their bilateral agreement for arbitration
proceedings. Broad highlights of the sample agreement are discussed in the following paragraphs.
90 OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Improving the resolution of tax treaty disputes, February 2007,
    Chapter A. No. 13
91 OECD Commentary on Article 25, Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration
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The process is initiated at the request of the taxpayer, which must be submitted in writing to one of the
competent authorities and accompanied by a statement of each of the persons either making the request
or directly affected by the case that no decision on the same issues has been rendered by a court or
administrative tribunal. Within 10 days of the receipt of the request, the competent authority who received
it shall send a copy of the request and the accompanying statements to the other competent authority.
The competent authorities need to agree on the Terms of Reference within three months of the
submission of the request and must communicate them to the taxpayer. The Terms of Reference contain
the questions to be decided by the arbitration panel and administrative information, such as the place and
language of arbitration and the briefing schedule.
Within three months after the Terms of Reference have been received by the person who made the
request for arbitration, the competent authorities shall each appoint one arbitrator. Within two months of
the appointment of the first two arbitrators, they in turn will appoint the Chair of the arbitral panel. It should
be noted that in contrast to the EU Arbitration, the competent authorities do not participate in the
arbitration process as they are not members of the arbitration panel.
The arbitrators review and assess the case at hand based on the facts and arguments presented and
decide independently. They may come to different opinions as the competent authorities as they are not
bound by the legal opinions expressed by the competent authorities (so-called “independent opinion”
approach92). This means that arbitrators are called upon to interpret the relevant laws and apply them to
the facts of the case as they have determined them.
The arbitral decision is determined by simple majority and must be presented in writing to the competent
authorities and the taxpayer within six months from the date on which the Chair notifies the competent
authorities and the taxpayer that he has all the information necessary to consider the case. The
competent authorities will implement the arbitration decision within six months from the communication of
the decision to them by reaching a mutual agreement on the case that led to arbitration. This requirement
serves to highlight the nature of the arbitration procedure – it is part of the MAP, of which it is firmly
embedded93.
The decision of the arbitral panel is binding for the Contracting States and only for the specific case at
hand. The Contracting States are not bound by the arbitration decision for future years or for other
taxpayers; thus, the decisions do not have precedential value94.
ii. Arbitration according to the UN Model
Article 25 of the UN Model provides two alternative versions of MAP, one of which provides for arbitration.
Under Article 25 paragraph 5 (alternative B), unresolved issues in MAP cases under Article 25 paragraph
1 that have not been resolved within three years can be submitted for arbitration if one of the competent
authorities so requests. The arbitration clause in Article 25 (alternative B) of the UN Model differs from
that in the OECD Model in several respects: three-years allowed to resolve the dispute by MAP as
against two years under the OECD MTC; arbitration must be requested by a competent authority under
the UN model as against the taxpayer under the OECD model; authority to the competent authorities to
92 OECD Commentary on Article 25, Annex, General approach of sample agreement, para. 2
93 Jasmin Kollmann, Laura Turcan, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for Austrian and
    International Tax Law, Chapter 2, 2.3.2.2.2 Arbitration process pursuant to Article 25 (5) of the OECD Model
94 Ismer in Klaus Vogel, Commentary on Double Taxation Conventions, Fourth Edition, Art. 25, No. 127
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depart from the arbitration decision and agree on a different solution within six months after the arbitration
decision is communicated.
The most important difference between the OECD and UN Models with respect to arbitration is that under
the UN Model, arbitration is not truly “mandatory” because it is required to be initiated by one of the
competent authorities rather than the taxpayer.
iii. EU Arbitration
There is an arbitration model already in place for all EU Member States under the EU Arbitration
Convention95. In contrast to the other models, the EU Arbitration is not agreed upon within tax treaties;
moreover the EU Arbitration Convention can be qualified as a kind of multilateral agreement. This means
the EU Convention applies for dispute resolution cases of double taxation between related parties within
the EU (it doesn’t apply even if one of the parties is not the EU Member State). The general concept of
the EU Arbitration is comparable to the one under the OECD Model (“independent opinion approach”).
One of the main differences compared to the arbitration according to the OECD model is the scope.
Arbitration under the EU Arbitration Convention is limited to transfer pricing cases and profit adjustments
resulting from permanent establishment issues. Another difference compared to the OECD Model is that
arbitration under the OECD Model is only applicable provided that no agreement was reached on all
issues. In contrast to this, EU Arbitration is available according to Article 7 of the EU Convention as long
as double taxation remains (at least partly). In contrast to the OECD model, the EU Convention includes
detailed rules concerning the election of the independent panel members. Thus, the contracting parties
involved are entitled to appoint five arbitrators from a common list of independent potential arbitrators.
In order to improve and accelerate the arbitration process (in light of the predictability of the taxpayer), the
EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum developed a Code of Conduct issued in 2004 by the Economic and
Financial Affair Council (ECOFIN)96. The Code of Conduct sets the rules of interpretation and application
of the EU Arbitration Convention.
It is also noteworthy that in October 2016, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Council
Directive on Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the EU. The Proposed Directive includes
a reinforced mandatory binding dispute resolution mechanism in the EU. The Proposed Directive builds
upon the Arbitration Convention, but broadens the scope to cover additional areas, beyond transfer
pricing and allocation of profits to permanent establishment, and provides features to address certain
identified shortcomings of the existing process to enhance the enforceability and the effectiveness of the
mechanism.
iv.    Baseball arbitration
In general, the baseball arbitration process (also known as “final offer” or “last best offer” arbitration) is
particularly common in the US. The process was developed as a result of salary disputes in the US
baseball league. Baseball arbitration was firstly introduced in the US tax treaties from 2008 onwards as a
result of the change of the OECD to include mandatory binding arbitration in 2008. The US generally uses
95 Convention 90/463/EEC
96 Code of Conduct for the Effective Implementation of the Arbitration Convention, see Commission
Communication 2004; in order to further improve the arbitration process the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (EU
JTPF) published its “Final Report on Improving the Functioning of the Arbitration Convention” in March 2015. The
report summarises the results of a monitoring exercise of the practical functioning of the Convention
(JTPF/002/2015/EN).
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the baseball arbitration for resolving MAP disputes wherever there is an arbitration provision in its tax
treaties.
The main feature of baseball arbitration, which distinguishes it from “independent opinion” arbitration, is
that the authority of the arbitrators is severely restricted. They are not allowed to reach an independent
decision on the case. Instead, their decision only involves the choice between the two options for
resolution offered by the contracting states97.
The Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration generally allows final offer arbitration as well as the
independent opinion approach and also any variation between these two options98, although the OECD
Model is in favour of the independent opinion approach.
According to the IRS, the arbitration process usually starts provided that the Contracting States did not
resolve the MAP tax dispute within a period of generally two years99. In contrast to the arbitration under
the OECD Model, the arbitration is initiated by the competent authorities and not by the taxpayer. The
arbitration panel will be determined by the competent tax authorities. However the taxpayer has a veto
right. Further, the taxpayer is allowed to submit his views on the case to the arbitration panel100.
In contrast to the arbitration, according to the OECD Model, where the arbitrators will review and assess
the specified case independently and entirely, the arbitrators within a baseball arbitration can only choose
between the two opinions presented by the Contracting States to the arbitration panel. They cannot
review the specified case themselves. As a consequence, a decision within a baseball arbitration can be
reached very fast compared to the independent opinion approach. This increases the speediness with
which the issue is resolved and lowers the cost101.
A side effect of the limited authority is that the “decision” is, in fact, just a number without any additional
information or comments by the arbitrators102. I.e., the arbitrators do not have to provide any reasons for
their decision in writing. While most arbitration cases are related to transfer pricing issues and therefore
revolve around the determination of the correct transfer price, the use of the final offer arbitration in other
cases, especially those where complex decisions are required might be limited103. In particular, in cases
of the interpretation of a tax treaty, it will be difficult to apply such an arbitration system as such an issue
is usually not limited to a numeric impact.
97 Raffaele Petruzzi, Petra Koch and Laura Turcan, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for
     Austrian and International Tax Law, Chapter 6, 6.2.2.1 The “single choice” mechanism
98 Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration, para. 2 and 3
99 Procedures for Requesting Competent Authority Assistance under Tax Treaties, 26 CFR 601.201: Rulings and
     determination letters; Section 10 Arbitration
100 Procedures for Requesting Competent Authority Assistance under Tax Treaties, 26 CFR 601.201: Rulings and
     determination letters; Section 10 Arbitration
101 Raffaele Petruzzi, Petra Koch and Laura Turcan, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for
     Austrian and International Tax Law, Chapter 6, 6.2.2.1 The “single choice” mechanism
102 Raffaele Petruzzi, Petra Koch and Laura Turcan, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for
     Austrian and International Tax Law, Chapter 6, 6.2.2.2 No written decisions
103 Raffaele Petruzzi, Petra Koch and Laura Turcan, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for
     Austrian and International Tax Law, Chapter 6, 6.2.2.1 The “single choice” mechanism
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Where a case involves several years, there are two possible procedural variations to deal with this: issue-
by-issue arbitration and package deals104. For e.g., the US and Canada have generally agreed on an
issue-by-issue arbitration. While the proposed resolutions and the respective position papers must cover
all years concerned, the arbitration panel will separately decide on each issue.
A comparison of the above arbitration model is given in Appendix 3.
4.5 Key considerations for designing an effective arbitration model
In the following paragraphs, we have discussed certain key considerations, which need to be taken into
account while deciding on the adoption of arbitration procedure as part of the MAP policy and designing
an effective arbitration model.
There are several factors to consider for defining an efficient arbitration model. These could include inter
alia:
· Time frame
· Personal resources
· Loss of sovereignty
· Transparency
· Costs
Time frame
The period of time, in which the arbitration resolution is reached, is one of the most critical factors
especially from the taxpayer’s perspective. As far as the time frame is considered, there is a significant
difference between the final offer approach and the independent opinion approach. Within the
independent opinion approach (as implemented in the OECD MTC and the EU Arbitration Convention),
the arbitrators have to review and assess the specified case completely and independently of any legal
opinions. Further, they have to present their argumentation and resolution in writing. In contrast to this,
the arbitrators within a final offer approach could summarily decide the case from the two options
presented by the parties and they even do not have to present their argumentation in writing. From a
timing perspective, the baseball arbitration will definitely be the faster alternative.
Personnel resources
The implementation of an efficient arbitration process requires that the competent authorities of each
country have the personnel resources available to deal with MAP as well as with arbitration in an
appropriate time frame and that they are familiar with the procedures and the cases.
Further, for an efficient arbitration process, it is imperative that the arbitrators have the relevant skillset.
They should have the expertise, good judgement and be independent. By expertise, it means that the
arbitrators need to have a deep understanding of (international) tax law and practice and should at least
be legally trained; further, at least one of the arbitrators (e.g., the chairman) should have experience in
arbitration matters. Other important attributes of arbitrators include: fluency in at least one of the
languages of the arbitration party and understanding of the cultural differences between countries.
(Disputes involving a UK multinational being taxed in China or a US multinational conducting businesses
104 Raffaele Petruzzi, Petra Koch and Laura Turcan, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for
     Austrian and International Tax Law, Chapter 6, 6.2.2.3 Package versus issue-by-issue arbitration
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in Venezuela require some understanding of the different cultures and sometimes long-standing issues
involved in the relationship105).
As it can be quite time-consuming to determine the arbitrators, it is recommendable that international
organisations should provide lists of arbitrators. States should have access to a list of arbitrators they can
choose from, so that they can have quick and objective information about the experience and
qualifications of potential arbitrators for their case106.
Loss of sovereignty
The main legal concern raised by countries (particularly, developing countries) is that an arbitration in tax
matters would lead to a loss of sovereignty. According to the critics, the final arbitration resolution (as a
MAP resolution) would lack legitimacy since the results would not have been approved by the legislature,
unlike treaties107. Hence, the arbitration resolution is not subject to the decision of the same governmental
institution approving of the tax treaty. Further, it is criticised that the Contracting States cannot influence
the decision of the arbitration panel at all, in particular when it comes to the independent opinion
approach. Within the independent opinion approach, the arbitration panel has to review, analyse and
assess the case in its entirety without taking into consideration the legal opinion of the Contracting
Countries. Insofar, the arbitrators are independent in their decision. In contrast to this, the arbitrators in a
final offer arbitration are bound by the offers presented by the Contracting Countries and can only choose
amongst one of them.
However, there could be counterarguments in response to the above concerns that the domestic
legislation is always limited and restricted when it comes to the application of international treaties; for
e.g., tax treaties. Agreeing on a tax treaty has already an impact on the sovereignty of a country. Further,
it should be considered that the Contracting States can principally nominate the arbitrators and to that
extent, have some influence on the process although they cannot directly influence their decision.
Transparency
A further concern relates to the lack of transparency. Arbitration proceedings are generally private
proceedings and the taxpayer who is concerned is not allowed to join the meetings. The decisions will
generally not be published (which is consistent with the MAP). As a consequence of this, there are no
precedential cases available. However, arbitrators should generally be consistent in their argumentation
and reasoning so that this becomes more an issue of reliance and trust. However, the lack of
transparency generates risks of either bias or the perception of it, both of which in turn contradict the main
objective of establishing a reliable arbitration process.
Costs
A further concern is that  particularly for countries with a rather nascent MAP/APA programme in place, a
one-time cost incurred for the establishment of competent, well-skilled and trained people to act as
arbitrators also needs to be considered.
105 Ricardo Escobar C., International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for Austrian and International Tax
     Law, Chapter 12, 12.4.1. A thoughtful award
106 Ricardo Escobar C., International Arbitration in Tax Matters, WU Institute for Austrian and International Tax
     Law, Chapter 12, 12.4.1. A thoughtful award
107 Luis Eduardo Schoueri, International Arbitration in Tax Matters, Chapter 8, 8.3.3 Fiscal sovereignty
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In addition to the one-time cost, the running costs incurred for an arbitration need to be taken into
consideration. The Contracting States have to bear costs for the arbitrators, traveling expenses,
administrative costs, amongst others.
While there are some concerns as discussed above in adoption of arbitration as part of the MAP policy,
they are not that big of an issue, which warrants absolute discarding of this dispute resolution
mechanism. Having regard to the positive impact of the arbitration procedure in resolution of conflicts and
also on the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall MAP process, it is advisable for Singapore to
consider adoption of mandatory binding arbitration. This can be done either by way of amendments of
existing bilateral tax treaties (at least with the major trading partners) or being a party to the multilateral
instrument designed as part of Action 15 (discussed in detail in the next section).
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5. Implications of the Multilateral Instrument developed as part of Action 15
5.1 Background of the Multilateral Instrument
Action 15 of the BEPS project provides for an analysis of the tax and public international law issues
related to the development of a multilateral instrument to enable countries that wish to do so to implement
measures developed in the course of the BEPS project and amend bilateral treaties. On the basis of this
analysis, interested countries came together to develop a multilateral instrument aimed at adapting
quickly to the changes suggested by the OECD as BEPS measures rather than amending each and
every bilateral treaty amongst the participating countries. This is an innovative approach with no exact
precedent in the tax world, though precedents for modifying bilateral treaties with a multilateral instrument
exist in various other areas of public international law.
On the analysis of international tax, public international law and political issues that arise from such an
approach, the BEPS report concluded that a multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible. Based on
this analysis, a mandate for the formation of an ad hoc group to develop a multilateral instrument on tax
treaty measures to tackle BEPS was approved by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in February
2015. The group commenced its work in May 2015. More than 100 jurisdictions concluded the
negotiations on a multilateral instrument, which was realised in November 2016. The new instrument is
expected to transpose results from the OECD/G20 BEPS project into more than 2,000 tax treaties
worldwide. A signing ceremony is scheduled to be held in Paris in June 2017.
5.2 Multilateral Instrument (Convention) released by the OECD – key characteristics
The Convention allows flexibility to the signatory countries to:
· Specify the tax treaties to which the Convention applies
· Choose a provision (out of the alternatives) that relates to a minimum standard
· Opting out of provisions or parts of provisions with respect to all the covered tax agreements
· Opting out of provisions or parts of provisions with respect to covered tax agreements that contain
existing provisions with specific, objectively-defined characteristics
· Choosing to apply optional provisions and alternative provisions to address a particular BEPS issue
Part VI of the Convention (Articles 18 through 26) reflects the result of the work of the Sub-Group on
Arbitration to develop provisions for the mandatory binding arbitration of mutual agreement procedure
cases, of which the competent authorities are unable to reach agreement within a fixed period of time.
The key points to be noted with respect to the arbitration mechanism provided for under the multilateral
instrument are as follows:
· The multilateral instrument gives a “choice” to countries to apply Part VI (Arbitration). In other words,
unlike the other Articles of the Convention, Part VI applies only between Parties that expressly
choose to apply the same with respect to their covered tax agreements by way of a notification.
· In addition, while Part VI includes some defined reservations, Parties that choose to apply Part VI
are also permitted to formulate their own reservations with respect to the scope of cases that will be
eligible for arbitration (subject to acceptance by the other Parties).
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· The Convention provides a flexibility to the competent authorities to agree to a different time period
(as against the two years mentioned in the Convention) with respect to a particular case, provided
that they notify the person who presented the case of such agreement prior to the expiration of the
two-year period. This different time period, with respect to a particular case, could be longer or
shorter than the two-year period depending, for example, on the nature and complexity of the
particular case.
· Arbitration decision shall be binding on both Contracting Jurisdictions except in three situations: (i) if
a person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement that implements the
arbitration decision; (ii) if the arbitration decision is held to be invalid by a final decision of the courts
of one of the Contracting Jurisdictions; and (iii) if a person directly affected by the case pursues
litigation in any court or administrative tribunal on the issues, which were resolved in the mutual
agreement implementing the arbitration decision.
· By default, a “final offer” arbitration process (otherwise known as “last best offer” arbitration) will
apply, except to the extent that the competent authorities mutually agree on different rules.
· The Convention gives an option to the countries to allow the competent authorities to depart from the
arbitration decision and agree on a different resolution within three calendar months after the
decision has been delivered to them. This may arise, for example, if the arbitration panel issues a
decision that both competent authorities consider to be an inappropriate resolution of the issues in
the case. This is an optional provision and will be applied with respect to a covered tax agreement
only if both Contracting Jurisdictions choose to apply it.
5.3 Multilateral Instrument – impact analysis
As recognised in the report on Action 15, there could be situations involving multi-country tax disputes,
which are easier to address multilaterally than in bilateral instruments108. In the absence of bilateral treaty
relationships between all of the parties, a number of governments are of the view that a multilateral MAP
or APA would only be possible where the multilateral instrument itself contains a specific multilateral MAP
provision, as well as an exchange of information provision that would permit taxpayer information to be
exchanged amongst all the parties (assuming there is not some other basis for exchange of information
between the parties, such as the MAC or a bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement)109.
Although competent authorities within tax administrations expressed interest in the possibility of
developing a multilateral MAP to resolve such multi-country disputes, some countries foresee legal
constraints in the absence of a hard law instrument authorising multilateral MAP110. Other countries do
not believe they can use MAP to resolve cases, which touch on issues not explicitly addressed in their
existing bilateral tax treaties in the absence of an international law instrument that provides that
authority111. These and other legal obstacles that arise in implementing multilateral MAP are sought to be
addressed in the context of the multilateral instrument.
108 Report on Action 15, I. A multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible, para 14
109 Report on Action 15, I. A multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible, Notes
110 Report on Action 15, I. A multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible, para 14
111 Report on Action 15, I. A multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible, para 14
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As it can be seen from the aforementioned points, the Convention developed provides for a “menu”
approach with all the options and flexibility to apply the provisions of the Convention to specific tax
treaties and specific provisions. This, to some extent, deviates from the stated objectives of the
multilateral instrument to swiftly adapt to the BEPS changes rather than revising each and every treaty
separately. The “pick and choose” approach given to the countries will force them to analyse the impact
of the multilateral instrument on each and every tax treaty they have entered into before deciding on the
specific treaties they would like to cover. This exercise by the countries is as good as revising each and
every treaty separately.
With respect to arbitration, the flexibility given to the competent authorities with reference to the time
period for resolution under MAP, distorts the “mandatory” nature of arbitration and tends to reduce the
effectiveness of this dispute resolution mechanism to provide certainty. In the authors’ view, an option
given to countries and the competent authorities to agree on a different resolution even after the delivery
of the arbitration decision further creates doubts with regards to the seriousness of which the proceedings
would be carried out at arbitration level.
5.4 Concluding remarks
As concluded in Section 4 of this report, Singapore should consider adopting mandatory arbitration as
part of its treaty policy. This can be done either by way of amendments of existing bilateral tax treaties (at
least with the major trading partners) or by being a party to the multilateral instrument designed as part of
the Action 15. In the authors’ view, there would not be much difference in terms of the efforts and time
frame involved for both options. Given the limitations of the arbitration model under the multilateral
instrument, it is advisable that Singapore considers developing its own arbitration model, with regards to
the key considerations mentioned in Para 4.5 of this report.
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6. Simultaneous audits and joint audits – alternatives to arbitration
The future of the tax world points to global integration and collaboration is. From a taxpayer’s perspective,
there appears to be increasing focus on attaining certainty for businesses by way of APAs and advance
rulings. From a tax administration’s perspective, one can see greater degrees of collaboration amongst
the countries and exchange of information to counter the BEPS situations. Undoubtedly, the global tax
landscape is undergoing a big shift and there have been efforts to find new, novel and more efficient ways
to manage controversy and dispute resolution. Joint audits and simultaneous tax audits are amongst
those new and novel approaches countries have been increasingly resorting to in recent years.
Simultaneous tax audits involve situations where the tax administrations of two or more countries
examine a taxpayer simultaneously, each in its own territory. As against this, a joint audit involves a
procedure where two or more countries join to form a single audit team to examine issues or transactions
of one or more related taxable persons with cross-border business activities, perhaps including cross-
border transactions involving related affiliated companies organised in the participating countries and in
which the countries have a common or complementary interest112. Simply put, joint audit refers to a
practice where two or more tax administrations will work together as a single team.
Legal basis for conducting simultaneous or joint audits
If the countries wish to explore the option of simultaneous or joint audit, it is first necessary to determine
the legal framework on which they can cooperate. The basis for cooperation can be found in a network of
bilateral and multilateral tax treaties such as:
· Article on “Exchange of information” in bilateral tax treaties, which imposes obligations on the
treaty partners to exchange information that is foreseeably relevant for implementation of both tax
convention and domestic fiscal legislation;
· Bilateral Information Exchange Agreements entered into; and
· The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (to which
Singapore is also a signatory).
Article 8 of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters provides a
legal foundation for conducting simultaneous tax examinations. Article 8 of the convention reads as
follows:
“Article 8 - Simultaneous tax examinations
1. At the request of one of them, two or more Parties shall consult together for the purposes of
determining cases and procedures for simultaneous tax examinations. Each Party involved shall
decide whether or not it wishes to participate in a particular simultaneous tax examination.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, a simultaneous tax examination means an arrangement
between two or more Parties to examine simultaneously, each in its own territory, the tax affairs of a
person or persons in which they have a common or related interest, with a view to exchanging any
relevant information which they so obtain.”
112 Report by OECD Forum on Tax Administration on Joint Audit, September 2010, para 7.
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Singapore could also consider legislating the framework for conducting simultaneous or joint audits under
the domestic law.
Suitability of simultaneous or joint audits
Joint audits could be considered113:
· When there is an added value compared to the procedure of exchange of information;
· When the countries have a complimentary or common interest in the fiscal affairs of one or more
related taxpayers; and
· In order to obtain a complete picture of a taxpayer’s tax liability in reference to some portion of its
operations, or to a specific transaction, where a domestic audit is not sufficient.
In September 2010, joint audit protocols appeared in an OECD report and practical guide was issued at
the end of the Istanbul meeting of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration. The OECD report identified
the need for joint audits and for tax administrators to cooperate and collaborate more closely. The
following list provides for illustrative issues that may be suitable for a joint audit114:
· Transfer pricing issues
· Complex business restructuring processes
· Split benefit agreements (including royalty payments)
· Cost allocation agreements
· Hybrid financial instruments
· Back-to-back loans
· Structured transactions
· Double-dip leases
· Service agreements and cost sharing agreements
· Private equity funds
· Dealings with source issues
Practical experiences
There have been cases in the past where two countries collaborated for joint audits. Canada and the US
conducted one such joint audit in 2013115. The US also conducted one such joint audit with Australia.
Russia has conducted simultaneous tax audits with Sweden and Finland116. EU countries have conducted
several simultaneous tax audits. The South African Revenue Service was undertaking a joint audit of a
High Net Worth Individual with the UK’s HMRC. In fact, the OECD report on joint audits mentions that
many of the 13 countries117 (forming the OECD Study Team for the report) have successfully pursued
cooperative activities, including simultaneous tax examinations.
113 Report by OECD Forum on Tax Administration on Joint Audit, September 2010, para 9.
114 Report by OECD Forum on Tax Administration on Joint Audit, September 2010, para 73
115 CRA, Summary of the Corporate Business Plan 2014-2015 to 2016-2017
116 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD, Peer Review Report Phase
2, Implementation of the standard in practice, Russian Federation, page 505
117 Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, the UK and
the US
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Douglas Shulman, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), US, in a speech on 8 June 2010
before the OECD118 strongly advocated joint audits as part of the “future of international tax
administration” and described joint audits as offering tax administrators the opportunity to increase tax
compliance. He emphasised that competent authority process often took years to resolve the double-tax
disputes. However, he added that joint audit allowed identification of the issue and understanding of the
facts quickly and on a bilateral / multi-lateral basis, which helped in the adjudication of these
disagreements right away and reaching a resolution through a much more efficient and effective process.
He also mentioned in his speech about the efforts put in by IRS to develop a protocol for joint audits.
Concluding remarks
Simultaneous tax audits or joint audits could help the countries to exchange the information, discuss the
issues and agree on the resolutions at an early stage and at the source itself, thus avoiding long-drawn
litigation and the related costs and efforts. These avenues thus seek to achieve the same objectives as
those of MAP and arbitration, while minimising the time, cost and avoiding the practical challenges /
constraints posed by the arbitration process. It is advisable for Singapore to consider the possibility of
conducting simultaneous / joints audits as an additional dispute resolution mechanism. In this regard, it
would need to consider the following key aspects:
· A legal basis to undertake joint tax audits – possibility of creating a framework under the domestic
law;
· Possibility of entering into a framework agreement with the taxpayers and other countries setting
forth the scope and terms of joint audit;
· Confidentiality and data protection for the information to be exchanged;
· Possibility of cooperation from the other country on reconciliation of differences between
administrative procedures and the differing audit / quality standards;
· Potential need for exchange of information outside the competent authority procedures
(exchange of information); and
· Time frame involved.
Disclaimer
The views reflected in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views
of the global EY organization or its member firms.
118http://www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/preparedremarksofcommissionerofinternalrevenuedouglashshulmanb
eforetheoecdbiac.htm
Appendix 1 – Overview of gap analysis regarding minimum standards
Minimum standards of Action 14 Singapore Japan China Korea Indonesia Malaysia USA
1.1. Do the tax treaties of your
country generally include
regulations according to para 1
to 3 of Art. 25 as interpreted in
the Commentary to the OECD
MTC?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Most of the
treaties
Yes Yes
Does your country provide
MAP access in transfer pricing
cases even in the case of the
tax treaty not providing for
regulations similar to Article 9
para. 2 of the OECD MTC?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1.2. Does your country provide
MAP access in case of
disagreement between the
taxpayer and the competent
authority as to whether the
conditions for the application
of a treaty anti-abuse rule have
been met?
Likely Yes Yes Unlikely No specific
regulation
Yes MAP relief
available in LOB
cases
Does your country provide
MAP access in case of
disagreement between the
taxpayer and the competent
authority as to whether the
conditions for the application
of a domestic anti-abuse rule
conflicts with the provisions of
the treaty?
Unlikely Yes Yes Unlikely No specific
regulation
No regulation No
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Does your country limit the
access to MAP in cases with the
requirements of paragraph 1 of
Article 25 of the OECD MTC
being met?
No No No No No No No
1.3. What is the average timeframe
for resolving MAP cases? Is it
within 24 months?
24 months
(depending on
complexity of
case)
22.4 months Usually two
years or longer
Approximately
two and half
years
Domestic tax
law provides
for three
years;
practically it
can take
much longer
Between one
to three years
depending on
the nature of
the MAP case
17.8-32.7
 months
1.4. As a FTA MAP Forum member,
does your country fully
participate in its work?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1.5. Does your country agree to
provide timely and complete
reporting of MAP statistics?
Not yet, likely
in future as a
BEPS associate
Yes Only internal
publication of
MAP cases
Included in the
OECD statistics
No statistics
publicly
available yet
No statistics
publicly
available yet
Yes
1.6. Has your country committed to
have their compliance with the
minimum standard reviewed
by their peers in the context of
the FTA MAP Forum?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No (not a
member of
the inclusive
framework)
Yes
1.7. What is the position of your
country on MAP arbitration?
Already introduced in national
law and common practice?
Not
introduced in
national law
or in common
practice
Already
introduced
in national
law and
common
practice
Not used in
common
practice
Under
consideration
No
arbitration in
place
No Arbitration
clauses in several
treaties;
introduced in
national law and
common practice
2. Has your country already had
appropriate administrative
processes and practices in
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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place of which competent
authorities are able to fully and
effectively carry out their
mandate to take an objective
view of treaty provisions and
apply them in a fair and
consistent manner?
2.1. Does your country provide for
and publish clear rules,
guidelines and procedures to
access and use the MAP? Is this
information publicly available?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2.3. Do the staff in charge of MAP
processes have the authority to
resolve MAP cases in
accordance with the terms of
the tax treaty?
Are they dependent on the
approval of the direction of the
tax administration personnel
who made the adjustments?
Are they influenced in their
decision?
Yes Yes No, there is an
approval process
from the
provincial level
to the SAT and
also within the
SAT
For the first
question, yes.
For the second
and third
question, no
Yes, Director
of Tax
Regulations
II has the
authority to
resolve MAP
cases
Yes, they do.
They are not
dependent on
approvals or
influences
insofar
Yes. MAP team is
independent of
the IRS team
responsible for
making TP
adjustments.
They are not
influenced, but
may rely on
auditors for fact-
finding
2.4. What are the performance
indicators for the competent
authority functions and staff in
charge of MAP processes?
Are they based on the amount
of sustained audit adjustments
or maintain tax revenue?
Not based on
the quantum
of tax
revenue. KPIs
not publicly
indicated but
likely to
include
number of
Yes No public
information.
Both could be
relevant factors
Based on
number of
cases resolved
Information
is not
publicly
available
It could be a
combination
of the two
Information is
not publicly
available
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cases resolved
as these are
reflected in
IRAS' Annual
Report
2.5. Does your country have
adequate people resources
(headcount / skills--wise)?
Yes Yes In the process of
building up such
resources
Yes,  there is a
dedicated MAP
team
CA team is
reasonably
skilled
because of
trainings;
from
practical
experience,
not sure
whether this
is sufficient
Yes Yes
2.6. Does your country provide
MAP programme guidance,
which makes it clear that audit
settlements between tax
authorities and taxpayers do
not preclude access to mutual
agreement procedure? Does
the CA of your country
consider independently
whether the audit settlement
would result for the taxpayer in
taxation not in accordance with
the provisions of the
Yes – the crux
lies in whether
the taxpayer
has applied
under the
relevant MAP
Article and is
able to
determine
which treaty
clause is in
breach, even
with the
Yes 1) Yes
2) Chinese tax
authorities are
sometimes quite
aggressive on TP
audit and they
may assess the
case from a
China TP / tax
collection
perspective
3) No, the SAT
issues a formal
1) No. The
taxpayer can
apply within
three years of
the
assessment
2) Yes
3) Technically,
yes
Audit
settlements
are not
formal in
nature and
nothing
precludes
access to
MAP
1) Yes. Also,
taxpayers are
encouraged to
notify the
Office of MAP
2) Yes
3) The MAP
authorities
will only
notify the
taxpayer, not
the CA of its
treaty partner
Obtaining MAP
relief is
considered an
exhaustion of
remedies
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Convention? If, in the case of
the CA not considering the
taxpayer's objection to be
justified, does it provide
appropriate notification of the
case to the CA of its treaty
partner?
settled
outcome
tax adjustment
notice to the
taxpayers who
can provide the
formal notice
and other
supporting
documents for
MAP
if the proposal
for MAP is not
to be initiated
and provide
reasons for
rejection
2.7. Does your country have
bilateral advance pricing
arrangement (APA)
programmes in place?
If yes, does your country
provide for a roll-back of the
APA to previous years?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3.1. In case of a rejection of the
MAP application, does your
country inform the other
country to comment on the
case (consultation process)?
No Yes No Application by
a taxpayer
cannot be
rejected by tax
authority
No The guidelines
are silent in
this aspect
No
3.2. Does your country limit the
access to MAP based on the
argument that insufficient
information was provided?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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1. Does your country generally include
a regulation similar to Article 9(2) of
the OECD MC in its tax treaties?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, most
of the tax
treaties
Yes Yes
2. Does your country have appropriate
administrative processes in place to
publish agreements reached as a
kind of best practice for other
taxpayers?
No No No, except basic
information of
APAs reached
during the year
No No No No
3. Does your country intend to
develop the "global awareness" of
the audit / examination functions
involved in international tax
matters through the delivery of the
Forum on Tax Administration's
"Global Awareness Training
Module" to appropriate personnel?
No
information
available
Yes No information
available
No
information
available
No No information
available
No information
available
4. Has your country implemented
bilateral APA programmes?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Are there appropriate procedures in
place in your country to allow
taxpayers to request for multi-year
resolution through MAP of
recurring issues?
Yes Yes Yes Yes No specific
regulation
Yes Yes
6. Does your country provide for
appropriate measures to provide
for a suspension of collections
procedures during a pending MAP
case (conditions similar to the
No
information
available
Yes No Yes No No Yes
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domestic administrative or judicial
remedy)?
7. Has your country implemented
appropriate administrative
measures to facilitate recourse to
the MAP to resolve treaty-related
disputes?
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No, based on
experience,
taxpayer and
Malaysian CA will
typically engage
their own legal
advisor
Guidance is
published on
requesting
MAP relief
8. Does your country publish in its
MAP guidance an explanation of the
relationship between the MAP and
domestic law administrative and
judicial remedies?
Yes Yes Yes, it is indicated
in the MAP
regulations that
such regulations
are drafted based
on the tax treaty
and domestic tax
law
Yes Yes,
domestic
disputes
can be run
in parallel
Yes, the CA will
require the
taxpayer to agree
to the suspension
of the domestic
legal remedies if
MAP request is
accepted
Yes
9. How does the competent authority
treat a bona fide taxpayer-initiated
foreign adjustment (e.g., of a tax
return) in the context of an ongoing
MAP case?
Subject to
agreement
with IRAS
- Look at a case by
case basis. Tax
adjustments will
be made based
on the final
agreement
reached between
the CAs
It is not
influenced
No specific
guidance
This depends on
the nature of
foreign
adjustment being
made
MAP relief is
generally
allowed in the
case of
taxpayer-
initiated
adjustments
10. Does your country also publish MAP
guidance regarding the
consideration of interest and
penalties?
No No No. In practice,
Chinese tax
authorities refer
to interest
provisions for TP
audit
No No No specific
regulation
No
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11. Does your country also publish MAP
guidance regarding multilateral
MAPs and APAs?
Yes No Yes, the MAP-
related
regulations apply
to multilateral
MAPs and APAs
Only APAs, in
the form of
an annual
report
No Yes Yes
Appendix 3 – Comparison of Arbitration Models
Criteria
Arbitration according to
OECD Model
Arbitration according to
UN Model EU Arbitration Baseball Arbitration
1.
Timeline for submitting arbitration
after having presented for MAP
Two years Three years Two years Generally two years
2.
Mandatory / voluntary binding
arbitration
Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory
3.
Who has to file for arbitration? Taxpayer Competent authorities Competent authorities Competent authorities
4.
Scope of arbitration Disqualification of any
tax treaty matters
Disqualification of any
tax treaty matters
Only transfer pricing
issues
Disqualification of any tax
treaty matters
5.
Independent opinion / final offer
approach
Independent opinion Independent opinion Independent opinion Final offer
